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TEN YEARS AFTER: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER AS A 
LABORATORY FOR FIRST AMENDMENT ADVOCACY 
AND ANAL YSIS 
Eric B. Easton· 
1. INTRODUCTION 
How many ways can one approach a First Amendment analysis? What 
influences a lawyer or a judge to select one analytical approach over 
another? And what is the long-term effect of a court's choice of one over 
another? In Bartnicki v. Vopper/ a 2001 case in which the U.S. Supreme 
Court considered federal and state statutes prohibiting the disclosure of 
illegally intercepted telephone conversations,2 we are privileged to have a 
small laboratory through which to study the first two questions. And, from 
the vantage point of ten years, we ought to be able to make some informed 
predictions as to the third. 
In Bartnicki, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the First Amendment 
gave the news media a right to publish truthful information on matters of 
public concern, even if unlawfully acquired, provided the publisher did not 
participate in the unlawful conduct.3 How the Court ultimately reached that 
conclusion is one principal focus of this Article, precisely because the story 
of this litigation reveals so much about alternative First Amendment 
analyses and the process of influencing the courts' choices among them. 
In this one case, the district court framed the issue as a battle between 
conflicting and potentially controlling precedents.4 The circuit court 
• Eric B. Easton is Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore School of Law. 
I 532 U.8. 514(2001). 
2 See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2010) ("Except 
as otherwise specifically provided in tllis chapter, any person who ... (c) intentionally discloses, or 
endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oml, or electronic communication, 
knowing or having reason to know that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, 
oml, or electronic communication in violation of this subsection . . . shall be punished . . . ."); 
Pennsylvania Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Control Act, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703 (2010) 
("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, a person is guilty of a felony of the third degree ifhe ... 
(2) intentionally discloses or endeavors to disclose to any other person the contents of any wire, 
electronic or oral communication, or evidence derived therefrom, knowing or having reason to know 
that the information was obtained through the interception of a wire, electronic or oral 
communication .... "). 
3 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 ("[A] stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First 
Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern."). 
4 See infra Part III. 
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selected a doctrinal formula called "intermediate scrutiny" and applied it in 
textbook fashion to reach its conclusion.5 And the U.S. Supreme Court 
resorted to an "ad hoc balancing" of interests in personal privacy versus 
publicly significant information, ultimately ruling in favor of the latter.6 
Even more interesting are the reasons why the courts made the 
decisions they did. Did they track the arguments of the party litigants? How 
influential was the U.S. government's intervention to defend the federal 
stahite at issue? And what role did the media defense bar play? Bartnicki 
provides an excellent opportunity to study the press's increasing 
sophistication in helping to shape First Amendment doctrine through 
litigation in the Supreme Court. 7 
Some seventy years earlier, the press's first serious effort in Near v. 
Minnesota8 established the supremacy of the right to publish.9 Forty years 
later, the disastrous decision in Branzburg v. Hayes lO stunted any First 
Amendment right to gather news and revealed the need for coordinated 
media attention to doctrinal litigation. I I Now, after another thirty years, the 
Bartnicki case brought publishing and newsgathering issues together, and 
this time the press proved to be up to the challenge. 
As interesting as this case may be from analytical and strategic 
perspectives, the implications of Bartnicki's contribution to First 
Amendment doctrine are difficult to discern. The Court allowed a law-
. abiding press to publish with impunity truthful, important information, 
regardless of its initial unlawful acquisition, but did it significantly expand 
the public's right to receive newsworthy information? 
The question actually presented by this case was whether the 
broadcaster could, consistent with the First Amendment, be punished for his 
dissemination of publicly significant information initially acquired from an 
unknown person who had illegally intercepted a private telephone 
conversation.12 Both federal and state statutes provided a civil cause of 
5 See infra Part IV. 
6 See infra Part VI. 
7 This is the fourth in a series of articles on the subject of the press as a constitutional litigator, 
beginning with Eric B. Easton, The Press as an Interest Group: Mainstream Media in the United States 
Supreme Court, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REv. 247 (2007) [hereinafter Interest Group] and including Eric B. 
Easton, The Colonel's Finest Campaign: Robert R. McCormick and Near v. Minnesota, 60 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 183 (2008) [hereinafter McCormick] and Eric B. Easton, A House Divided: Earl Caldwell, the New 
York Times, and the Quest for a Testimonial Privilege, 2009 UTAH L. REv .. 1293 [hereinafter Caldwell]. 
8 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
9 See McCormick, supra note 7, at 223. 
10 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
II See Caldwell, supra note 7, at 1294. 
12 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514,524-25 (2001). 
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action for not only the interception, but also the further disclosure of the 
intercepted conversation. 13 
In declaring the disclosure provision unconstitutional as applied, 
however, the Court declined to abstract its holding to a legal principle. The 
ambiguity of the decision suggests that a different balance could be struck if 
the subject matter of the disclosure were, say, national security rather than 
labor relations matters. The conclusion of this Article looks to the 
contemporary WikiLeaks.com controversy to illuminate this issue ,14 
Part II of this Article recounts the underlying facts of the Bartnicki case 
and its procedural posture up to certiorari. Part III examines the two 
contending precedents initially asserted by the parties and accepted as the 
basis for analysis in the district court. Part IV looks at the shift to doctrinal 
analysis in the court of appeals, prompted at least in part by the federal 
government's entry into the case. Part V studies the proceedings before the 
U.S. Supreme Court, with emphasis on the participation and analytical 
approach of prominent media lawyers. Part VI dissects the opinion and the 
shift to an ad hoc balancing approach, particularly in light of the press 
arguments, while Part VII ventures some predictions about the significance 
of the decision with the WikiLeaks.com controversy as a backdrop. 
II. "BLOW OFF THEIR FRONT PORCHES"? 
The Wyoming Valley of Pennsylvania encompasses the cities of 
Scranton, Pittston, and Wilkes-Barre, and numerous smaller towns, 
including the boroughs of Courtdale, Edwardsville, Forty Fort, Larksville, 
Luzerne, Plymouth, Pringle, Kingston, and Swoyersville. 15 These towns, all 
by Interstate Highway 81 and just a little northwest of Wilkes-Barre, are 
served by the Wyoming Valley West School DistriCt. 16 The district boasts 
seven elementary schools, a middle school, and a high school, with about 
5,000 students altogether.17 
13 See 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a) (2010) ("[AJny person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is 
intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover 
from the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as 
may be appropriate."); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5725(a) (2010) ("Any person whose wire, electronic or 
oral communication is intercepted, disclosed or used in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause 
of action against any person who intercepts, discloses or uses or procures any other person to intercept, 
disclose or use, such communication .... "). 
14 See Wikileaks, 1HE HUFF\NGTON POST, http://www.huffingtonpostcomlnewslwikileaks (last visited 
Nov. 23,2011). 
15 Wyoming Valley West School District, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.orglwikilWyominlL 
Valley-West_School_District (last modified Oct. 14,2011). 
16 [d. 
17 [d. 
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From mid-1992 until November 1993, the district was tom by a 
contract dispute between the Wyoming Valley West School Board and the 
Wyoming Valley West Education Association, the union representing the 
district's 341 teachers. 18 Five months of hard bargaining for a new teachers' 
contract turned nasty in October 1992, when the board decided to warn 
teachers that they might be subject to furlough a week before the next 
scheduled bargaining session. 19 By March 1993, the teachers had halted all 
volunteer work, including chaperoning school activities/o and in May the 
union threatened to strike in early June unless their salary demands were 
met.21 
The union was asking for six percent increases each year for the next 
three years, raising the average salary from $40,000 to $47,640 in 1994.22 
The board was standing firm at three percent per year for three years?3 The 
teachers' health insurance plan was also in dispute?4 At 10:30 p.m. on May 
27, 1993, the union delivered a strike notice to the home of Superintendent 
Dr. Norman Namey/5 and on June 4, the teachers launched their first strike 
in the twenty-seven-year history of the district.26 
The timing of that strike was the subject of one particular cellular 
telephone conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane, Jr., 
18 See Leanora Minai, Teachers at WVW Threaten to Strike: The Situation Appears 'Bleak,' a School 
Director Concedes, TiMEs LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), May 22, 1993, at A3, available at httpilwww.times 
leader.comIarchivel6865272.htrnl. 
19 James Rubin, Union Head: Furlough Slips Add Tension to WVW Contract Talks: Teachers and 
Board Directors in the Wyoming Valley West School District Returning to Bargaining Table This Week, 
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 19, 1992, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/ 
6865272.html. 
20 Charles H. Bogino, Volunteer Work Halted by Teachers at WVW: Activities and Chaperoning 
Are Falling Victim to a Contract Dispute Between Teachers and the School District, TIMES LEADER 
(Wilkes-Barre), Mar. 19, 1993, at AI, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/6865272.html. 
21 Minai, supra note 18. 
22 Id. 
23 Tom Obrzut & Gina Thackara, Contract Offer Best We Can Do. Says WVW Board Member: 
Under the Proposal. Teachers Would Receive a 3-Percent Raise Each Year for the Next Three Years, 
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 7, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/ 
6865272.html. 
24 Anne Karolyi, WVW Could See Strike in Exam Week: Salary Increases and a Health Insurance 
Plan Are the Two Chief Points of Contention, the Head of the Teachers' Union Says, TIMES LEADER 
(Wilkes-Barre), May 29, 1993, at AI, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/6865272.html. 
2l Id. 
26 Anne Karolyi, Striking Wyoming Valley West Teachers Picket the High School Friday in 
Plymouth While Seniors File into the Cafeteria: Economics Lesson Valley West Strike to End Tuesday. 
but Battle over Contract Will Continue, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), June 6, 1993, at AI, available at 
http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html. The teachers picketed on Friday and Monday, then 
went back to school on Tuesday in compliance with a state statute. See id. 
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sometime in May.2? Bartnicki was employed by the Pennsylvania State 
Education Association (PSEA) and assigned as a negotiator in the 
Wyoming Valley West School District contract dispute.28 Kane was a 
teacher at Wyoming Valley West High School and president of the PSEA 
local, the Wyoming Valley West Education Association.29 
But it was another remark by Kane that captured the attention of the 
public-and the legal system-when the conversation was broadcast 
several months later: "If they're [the School Directors] not going to move 
for three percent (3%), we're gonna have to go to their, their homes ... to 
blow off their front porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those 
guys .... ,,30 How the public came to know of this conversation forms the 
factual predicate of this case. 
The contentious contract negotiations prompted the formation of a 
citizens' group called the Wyoming Valley West Taxpayers' Association to 
oppose the teachers' union proposals?l Sometime after the conversation 
took place, still during the spring of 1993, the president of that organization, 
Jack Yocum, allegedly found a five-minute tape of the conversation in his 
mailbox.32 Yocum claimed not to know who made the tape or why,33 but he 
listened to it, identified the voices, played it for some school board 
members, and gave copies of the tape to Frederick W. Vopper. 34 Vopper 
had a news and public affairs talk show under the name "Fred Williams" 
that was broadcast on WILK Radio and simulcast on WGBI-AM.35 
By all accounts, Vopper did nothing with the tape until late 
September.36 By then, contract negotiations had completely broken down, 
the dispute had been submitted to non-binding arbitration, the arbitrator had 
sided with the teachers' union, and the school board had rejected the 
27 A transcript of the conversation between Bartnicki and Kane was prepared by WILK Radio, one 
of the defendants in Barrnicki v. Vopper, and a copy of the transcript is attached to the Media 
Defendants' answer (29a-30a) and their motion for summary judgment, as Exhibit "A" (315a-326a). 
Amended Brief of Appellants at 8, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156), 
1998 WL 34082380, at *8. The exact date oftb.e conversation is not in the record. 
28 Id. at 3, 1998 WL 43082380, at .3. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 8, 1998 WL 43082380, at .8. 
31 Id. at 6, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·6. 
32 Id. at 7, 1998 WL 43082380, at·7 (citing Yocum's deposition). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. Yocum also gave copies to Rob Neyhard at WARM Radio, and Kane's deposition states that 
copies were given to the Times Leader and Citizens' Voice newspapers, as well as television stations 
WNEP-TV and WBRE-TV. Only Yocum, Vopper, and the two radio stations that carried Vopper's 
program were named as defendants in the subsequent lawsuit. Id. at 7-8, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·7-8. 
35 Id. at 7,1998 WL43082380, at *7. 
36 See id. at 8, 1998 WL 43082380, at ·8. 
292 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50:287 
arbitrator's decision.37 About the same time, Vopper, who had been critical 
of the teachers' union in the past/8 began airing the tape repeatedly, while 
adding bomb-like sound effects.39 Intended or not, the tapes had the effect 
of further inflaming the contract dispute,40 and the Luzerne County District 
Attorney launched an investigation at the behest of the school board.41 In 
the end, neither his investigation nor another undertaken by the PSEA could 
determine who actually made the tape.42 According to Vopper's first 
attorney, the question remains unanswered to this day.43 
The contract dispute was ultimately settled in November after the 
school board offered salary increases of sixteen percent over four years,44 
but the controversy over Vopper's broadcasts continued; in August 1994, 
Bartnicki and Kane filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the 
Middle District of Pennsylvania against Vopper and the parent companies 
of the stations that carried his show (the "media defendants") under civil 
suit provisions of federal and state wiretap laws.45 The unknown persons 
who intercepted the conversation were also named as John Doe and Jane 
Doe.46 
The media defendants retained Donald H. Brobst of the Wilkes-Barre 
law firm Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., to represent them in district 
37 Anne Karolyi, Arbitrator Suggests Raises at WVW: The Negotiator Says Teachers Should 
Receive Their Requested Salary Increase. but Directors Seem Unwilling to Sway from Their Offer, 
TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Sept. 28, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchive/ 
6865272.html. The Supreme Court opinion says the parties accepted the arbitrator's proposal, but the 
contemporaneous news reports seem more reliable on this point. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 512 U.S. 514, 
519 (2001). 
38 Bannicki, 512 U.S. at 519. 
39 Brief of Appellees at 5, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999) (No. 98-7156),1998 
WL 34083465, at *5. Indeed, the District Attorney for Wilkes-Barre testified that Vopper and WILK 
were so irresponsible that his office refused to send press releases to WILK. Brief of Pennsylvania State 
Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3 n.l, Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109 
(No. 98-7 I 56), 1998 WL 34083460, at *3 n. I . 
40 Anne Karolyi, Alleged Threat by Union Heightens WVW Friction: Those Who Have Heard the 
Tape Allege Someone Says School Directors Could Suffer Property Damage at Their Homes if They Do 
Not Make Contract Concessions, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 3, 1993, at A3, available at 
http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html. 
41 See Jim Van Nostrand, DA Will Probe Alleged Threats upon WVW Request: Several Directors 
Say They Will Ask Fellow Board Members to Formally Request an Investigation. Perhaps at Tonight's 
Meeting, TIMES LEADER (Wilkes-Barre), Oct. 2, 1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.coml 
archive/6865272.html. 
42 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 7,1998 WL 34082380, at *7. 
43 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald, L.L.P., in Wilkes-Barre, Pa. 
(June 25, 2010) (recording on file with author). 
44 Anne Karolyi, The Battle Ends: Valley West Board OKs Pact on 5-4 Vote, TIMES LEADER 
(Wilkes-Barre), Nov. 4,1993, at A3, available at http://www.timesleader.comlarchivel6865272.html. 
45 See supra note 13. 
46 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 3, 1998 WL 34082380, at *3. 
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court.47 Brobst had long represented WILK and its then-parent company, 
Keyrnarket of NEPA (Northeastern Pennsylvania), Inc., and this was 
neither the first nor the last case he had involving Fred Vopper.48 In 
addition to his defamation and other media law work, Brobst specialized in 
employment law cases,49 and he both initiated and defended cases brought 
under § 1983 of title 42 of the U. S. Code, which gives plaintiffs a federal 
cause of action when deprived of a constitutional right under color of state 
law. 
The media defendants filed their answer in September.50 The following 
February, they consented to the plaintiffs' amending their complaint to add 
Yocum as a defendant.51 Yocum answered on June 30, 1995.52 After 
extensive discovery, the plaintiffs and the defendants moved for summary 
judgment, with both defendants asserting a First Amendment right to 
disclose the conversation. 53 By Memorandum and Order dated June 17, 
1996, the District Court denied both motions, ruling that the circumstances 
of the interception and the defendants' knowledge of them represented 
genuine issues of material fact, but that imposing liability on the defendants 
would not violate the First Amendment.54 
The court denied the defendants' subsequent motion to reconsider in 
November, and in January 1998, the court certified that its orders were 
appealable. 55 On January 14, the media defendants filed an appeal in the 
47 See Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
48 See id 
49 See id 
50 Amended Briefof Appellants, supra note 27, at 3, 1998 WL 34082380, at *3. 
51 Id. at 4, 1998 WL 34082380, at *4. 
52 Id. 
5} Id. 
54 Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 U.S. Dis!. LEXIS 22517, at *12 (M.D. Pa. June 
14,1996). 
55 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2. The court ruled 
that the orders denying summary judgment "involved controlling questions of law as to which there is 
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal ... will materially advance 
the ultimate determination of this litigation." Id. at 5,1998 WL 34082380, at *5. As articulated by the 
Third Circuit, those questions were: 
(1) whether the imposition of liability on the media Defendants under the [wiretapping 
statutes] solely for broadcasting the newsworthy tape on the Defendant Fred Williams' radio 
news/public affairs program, when the tape was illegally intercepted and recorded by 
unknown persons who were not agents of the Defendants, violates the First Amendment; and 
(2) whether imposition of liability under the aforesaid [wiretapping statutes] on Defendant 
Jack Yocum solely for providing the anonymously intercepted and recorded tape to the 
media Defendants violates the First Amendment. 
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113-14 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.s. 1260 (2000). 
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u.s. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit with the concurrence of the 
other parties to the litigation. 56 The Third Circuit granted the petition on 
February 26,57 and after receiving briefs from the parties58 and the PSEA as 
amicus curiae,59 heard oral arguments on October 5. The United States, 
which intervened as of right and at the invitation of the court to defend the 
constitutionality of the federal statute,60 filed a brief on November 17, 
1998,61 but to no avail. On December 27, 1999, the Third Circuit reversed 
the District Court,62 and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on June 
26,2000.63 
III. DISTRICT COURT: BATTLE OF THE PRECEDENTS 
In his motion for summary judgment, Brobst had argued for the media 
defendants that Bartnicki and Kane could not prove that their telephone 
conversation had been illegally-that is, intentionally and not 
inadvertently-intercepted, or that Vopper knew or had reason to know that 
the telephone conversation was illegally intercepted.64 He also argued that 
Bartnicki had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the conversation, 
which took place on a cellular telephone that she acknowledged was 
susceptible to interception.65 Brobst later conceded that neither of these 
factual arguments was persuasive, and that he staked everything on the First 
Amendment argument from the beginning.66 Brobst's First Amendment 
argument relied almost exclusively on Landmark Communications, Inc. v. 
Virginia and the line of constitutional privacy cases, beginning with Cox 
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn and ending with Florida Star v. B.J.F,67 to 
56 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2. 
57 [d. 
58 See Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, 1998 WL 34083465; Addendum to Brief of Appellees, 
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109 (No. 98-7156),1998 WL 34082372; Briefon Behalf of Appellee, Jack Yocum, 
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d \09 (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082376; Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 
27, 1998 WL 34082380. 
59 See Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees, supra note 39, 1998 WL 34083460. 
60 Brief for the United States at I, Bartnicki, 200 F.3d 109 (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082480, at 
*1. 
61 !d. 
62 Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129. 
63 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 530 U.S. 1260 (2001). 
64 Brief in Support of Media Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 
3:CV-94-1201, at 19 (M.D. Pa. July 1996) (on file with author). 
65 [d. at 21. 
66 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
67 Brief in Support of Media Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 64, at 14-19. 
See infra Part II.A for a discussion of this line of cases. Throughout this Article, the lawyers and judges 
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which Landmark belongs. Those cases held that "where the media lawfully 
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance or 
concern, government officials may not constitutionally punish the 
publication of that information absent the need to further a government 
interest of a higher order.'.68 Brobst later said he focused on Landmark in 
particular because the governmental interests there-maintaining the 
reputation of the judges and the institutional integrity of the courts-were 
far greater than the privacy interests protected in this case.69 
To U.S. District Court Judge Edwin M. Kosik, however, the Bartnicki 
case essentially countered Brobst's Landmark rule with another well-
established First Amendment principle: that "generally applicable laws 'do 
not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement against 
the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the 
news. ",70 Judge Kosik referred to this principle as the Cohen doctrine after 
Cohen v. Cowles Media, the only case cited for that proposition in his 
opinion/I despite its much earlier origins.72 A closer examination of the two 
conflicting precedents follows. 
A. The Constitutional Privacy Cases 
The genesis of the notion that plaintiffs ought to be able to recover for 
an invasion of their privacy was an 1890 Harvard Law Review article by 
Louis Brandeis and his law partner Samuel Warren.73 The concept did not 
exist in English common law, and invasion of privacy is often called the 
only truly American tort. Dean William L. Prosser's classification scheme 
for the American common law privacy torts included misappropriation of 
name or likeness, publicity in a false light, intrusion on seclusion, and 
disclosure of private facts. 74 Apart from the five cases that substantively 
parallel the tort of disclosure of private facts-which are the central focus 
will variously reference this line, and the principle derived from it, as the Landmark, Daily Mail, or 
Florida Star rule or principle. 
68 Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June 
14,1996). 
69 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
70 Bartnicki, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *11 (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 
663,669 (1991)). 
71 Id. See infra Part II.B for a discussion of this case. 
72 As applied to First Amendment claims, the doctrine goes back at least as far as Grosjean v. 
American Press Co., which contained Justice Sutherland's dictum that owners of newspapers are not 
"immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for support of the government." 297 U.S. 233,250 
(1936). 
73 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890). 
74 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383,389 (1960). 
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of this section-only three privacy cases involving the press ever reached 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
In the 1967 case of Time, Inc. v. Hill, the Court declined to award 
damages in a false light privacy claim under a New York statute absent a 
showing of actual malice.75 In the 1974 case of Cantrell v. Forest City 
Publishing Co., the Court upheld a jury verdict finding that a Cleveland 
Plain Dealer reporter had knowingly placed the Cantrell family in a false 
light through numerous inaccuracies and false statements in his article 
about them.76 And in the 1977 case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard 
Broadcasting Co., the Court held that an Ohio television station 
misappropriated the entire act of a circus "human cannonball" by filming 
and broadcasting his entire, fifteen-second act. 77 
Of far greater importance, however, was the series of five privacy-
related cases that reached the Court between 1975 and 1989. None of these 
cases directly implicated the tort of public disclosure of private facts; the 
press rarely lost those cases in the state courts because of an absolute 
"newsworthiness" defense that was said to have "swallowed" the tort itself. 
The cases that did get to the Court, however, were all based, directly or 
indirectly, on statutes that criminalized the publication of truthful, but 
embarrassing, information. Sometimes they were characterized as prior 
restraints, sometimes as subsequent punishment. 
On August 18, 1971, Cynthia Leslie Cohn, seventeen, was raped and 
suffocated to death by six high school boys following a drinking party in 
Sandy Springs, Fulton County, Georgia.78 In April 1972, when the six 
perpetrators were arraigned, five pled guilty to rape-the murder charges 
against them having been dropped-and a date was set for the trial of the 
youth who pled not guilty.79 A reporter covering the case for WSB-TV duly 
broadcast the story later that day, including, for the first time in any media, 
the name of the victim.80 The reporter had learned the name from personal 
observation of the proceedings and from the indictments, which were public 
records available to anyone who asked.81 The next month, Martin Cohn, 
Cynthia Cohn's father, filed a lawsuit against the Cox Broadcasting Corp., 
the owner of WSB-TV, for invasion of privacy and for violating a Georgia 
7S 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967). 
76 419 U.S. 245, 252-53 (1974). 
77 433 U.S. 562, 563-66 (1977). 
78 Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 471, 474 n.5 (1975). 
79 Id. at 472. 
80 Id. at 473-74. 
81 Id. at 472-73. 
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statute that prohibited the publication or broadcasting of the name of any 
rape victim.82 
The trial court held that the statute gave Cohn a private right of action 
against Cox, notwithstanding the broadcaster's constitutional claims, and 
granted Cohn summary judgment as to liability, with damages to be 
considered at a later jury trial. 83 On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held 
that the statute did not give Cohn a private right of action, so summary 
judgment was inappropriate, but also that Cohn's common law invasion of 
privacy claim was not precluded by the First Amendment.84 On a motion 
for rehearing, the state supreme court held that the statute was an 
authoritative declaration of state policy to the effect that the name of a rape 
victim was not a matter of public concern, so the right to disclose that 
information was not protected by the First Amendment.8s The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn. 86 
Writing for a nearly unanimous Court-only Justice Rehnquist 
dissented-Justice White got to the heart of the matter. "Because the 
gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of information, whether 
true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or otherwise painful 
to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly confront the 
constitutional freedoms of speech and press.,,87 Determined to approach the 
constitutional balance cautiously, Justice White largely restricted his 
holding to the facts at hand. The state may not, he wrote, "impose sanctions 
on the accurate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from 
public records-more specifically, from judicial records which are 
maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves 
are open to public inspection. ,,88 If the state wanted to keep such 
information from the press, the Court said, it would have to find some way 
to avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information, 
possibly by sealing court records containing such facts.89 Only Justice 
Douglas would have ruled on broader grounds: that "there is no power on 
the part of government to suppress or penalize the publication of 'news of 
82 !d. at 474. 
83 [d. 
84 !d. at 474-75. 
85 [d. at 475. 
86 [d. at 476. 
87 !d. at 489. 
88 [d. at 491. 
89 [d. at495-96. 
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the day. ",90 Justice Rehnquist's dissent turned on jurisdiction, not the 
merits.91 
While only regional media companies participated in the Cox case, the 
next privacy case to reach the Court drew the attention of the American 
Newspaper Publishers Association (ANPA). Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. 
District Court in and for Oklahoma County was not a tort case at all,92 but 
rather challenged an injunction issued by the county court prohibiting the 
news media from "publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any 
manner, the name or picture" of an eleven-year-old boy alleged to have shot 
and killed a railroad switchman.93 Reporters were able to learn his name and 
take his photograph during and after an open detention hearing, and they 
used both in the newspaper, radio, and television stories that followed.94 A 
few days later, when the boy appeared in court again for arraignment, the 
judge closed the proceeding and issued the injunction.95 On appeal, the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the judge's order, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court stayed the order.96 It granted certiorari and, in the same per curiam 
opinion, reversed.97 
As if to illustrate the relationship between prior restraint and privacy 
cases, the Court, relying on both Cox and Nebraska Press v. Stuart,98 held 
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court to 
prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at 
court proceedings which were in fact open to the public.,,99 The Court's 
very brief opinion closely tracked the arguments made by ANP A in its 
amicus brief, but did not follow ANPA's suggestion for a general rule to 
avoid "a constant stream of minor fact variations which will needlessly take 
up the time of this Court and ofthe press in preventing encroachments upon 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments by trial judges who do not yet believe 
or perhaps understand the teachings of this Court .... ,,100 The Court 
90 Id at 501 (Douglas, 1., concurring). 
91 Id at 501 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
92 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). 
93 Id at 308-{)9 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Id at 309. 
9S Id at 308, 309 n.l. 
96 Id at 308. 
97 Id. at 309. 
98 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing a court order prohibiting publication of facts adduced in open 
trial). 
99 Okla. Pub/'g Co., 430 U.S. at 310. 
100 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n at 18, Okla. Publ'g Co., 430 U.S. 
308 (No. 76-867),1977 WL 189322, at *18. 
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continued to resist formulating a broad, general rule in the next privacy-
related case the following year. 
On October 4, 1975, Landmark's Virginian-Pilof published an article 
that accurately reported on a pending inquiry by the Virginia Judicial 
Inquiry and Review Commission and identified the state judge whose 
conduct was being investigated. 101 A month later, a grand jury indicted 
Landmark for violating a state statute by ''unlawfully divulg[ing] the 
identification of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the 
subject of an investigation and hearing" by the Commission.102 Landmark 
was convicted of a misdemeanor in a bench trial and fined $500.103 The 
Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, citing the need to protect 
the judge's reputation from the publicity that might attend frivolous claims; 
preserve public confidence in the judicial system; and protect complainants 
and witnesses before the Commission. I04 Landmark appealed to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. \05 
In contrast to Cox and even Oklahoma Publishing, Landmark attracted 
the attention of a substantial number of media companies and press 
associations. \06 The media companies argued that under the Constitution, 
none of the purported interests cited by the Virginia Supreme Court could 
be protected by imposing criminal sanctions on the press and calling for a 
rule barring accurate reports of government affairs.107 The press 
associations similarly argued that the Constitution barred states from 
imposing criminal sanctions for publishing information on the public duties 
of public officials. \08 As before, the Court shied away from any generalized 
pronouncement. Writing for a nearly unanimous Court, Chief Justice 
101 Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 831 (1978). 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 832. 
104 Id. at 833. 
105 Id. at 834 (indicating that the Court noted probable jurisdiction and reversed the Virginia Supreme 
Court's decision). 
106 See Brief Amicus Curiae of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 
435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450), 1977 WL 189715 [hereinafter Brief of Media Companies]; Brief of the 
National Newspaper Ass'n & the Arizona Newspapers Ass'n et a!. as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Appellant, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450), 1977 WL 189717 [hereinafter Brief 
of Press Associations]; Brief of the Washington Post Co. & CBS Inc. et a!., Amici Curiae, in Support of 
Reversal, Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450),1977 WL 189719; Motion of the 
ACLU and the ACLU of Virginia for Leave to File Brief Amici Curiae, and Brief Amici Curiae, 
Landmark Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 829 (No. 76-1450),1977 WL 189721. 
107 Brief of Media Companies, supra note \06, 1977 WL 189719, at * 16-33. 
108 Brief of Press Associations, supra note 106, 1977 WL 189717, at *4-15. 
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Burger found it "unnecessary to adopt this categorical approach to resolve 
the issue.,,109 He continued: 
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether the First 
Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third persons who are 
strangers to the inquiry, including the news media, for divulging or 
publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the 
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission. We are not here concerned with 
the possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the information 
by illegal means and thereafter divulges it. 
... We conclude that the publication Virginia seeks to punish under its 
statute lies near the core of the First Amendment, and the 
Commonwealth's interests advanced by the imposition of criminal 
sanctions are insufficient to justify the actual and potential encroachments 
on freedom of speech and of the press which follow therefrom. 110 
Even without propounding the general rule sought by the press, the 
Court had, in these three cases, begun to make clear that privacy interests-
including the name of a rape victim, a juvenile offender, or even a judge 
merely accused of wrongdoing-would not be enough to overcome the 
presumptive right of the press to publish truthful information, lawfully 
acquired, on matters of public concern, even if the publication was 
otherwise prohibited by a state's legislature or its courts. I II In Smith v. 
Daily Mail Publishing Co., the Court would make that rule explicit. I 12 
The 1979 case, like Oklahoma Publishing, involved an indictment 
against two West Virginia newspapers for violating state law by publishing, 
without a court's permission, the name of a fourteen-year-old who had shot 
and killed a high school classmate.113 In this case, however, the reporters 
did not obtain the name in open court, but by monitoring the police band 
radio frequency, going to the scene, and interviewing witnesses, police, and 
a prosecutor.114 The papers sought and won a writ of prohibition against 
prosecution from the West Virginia Supreme Court, which held that 
prosecution would be unconstitutional under recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions, but the attorney general of West Virginia filed a successful 
109 LandmarkCommc'ns,!nc.,435 u.s. at 838. 
110 [d. at 837, 838 (citations omitted). 
III [d. at 841-42. 
112 443 U.S. 97,105--06 (1979). 
113 [d at 99-100. 
114 [d at 99. 
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petition for certiorari on behalf of the trial judge, Robert K. Smith." s Once 
again, the press amici came out in force to support the newspapers." 6 Once 
again, the ACLU added its voice to that of the press. 117 Once again, Floyd 
Abrams, who had represented Landmark Communications, was 
representing the newspaper. 118 Once again, the Chief Justice wrote the 
opinion for a nearly unanimous COurt. 119 
Because of the language of the statute requiring a court order before 
publishing the name of a juvenile offender, the press amici tended to 
characterize the statute as a prior restraint-even though the information 
had already been published and the case reached the Court through a 
criminal prosecution. 120 Chief Justice Burger agreed after a fashion: 
Whether we view the statute as a prior restraint or as a penal sanction for 
publishing lawfully obtained, truthful information is not dispositive 
because even the latter action requires the highest form of state interest to 
sustain its validity. Prior restraints have been accorded the most exacting 
scrutiny in previous cases. However, even when a state attempts to punish 
publication after the event it must nevertheless demonstrate that its 
punitive action was necessary to further the state interests asserted. Since 
we conclude that this statute cannot satisfy the constitutional standards 
defined in Landmark Communications, Inc., we need not decide whether, 
d b d · d . . 121 as argue y respon ents, It operate as a pnor restramt. 
But Chief Justice Burger went further and gave the press the general 
rule it had been seeking. He pointed out that in the previous cases-Cox, 
Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications-the press received 
the information from the government or government sources, so those cases 
did not directly control the outcome here, where the press gathered the 
information through routine reporting techniques. 122 Asserting that it made 
no difference-"[a] free press cannot be made to rely solely upon the 
lIS Id at 100. 
116 Motion of Chicago Tribune Co. for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily 
Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (No. 78-482), 1979 WL 199841; Motion of American Newspaper Publishers 
Ass'n for Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.s. 97 (No. 
78482), 1979 WL 199845 [hereinafter Brief of American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n); Motion of American 
Society of Newspaper Editors & Radio Television News Directors Ass'n et aI. fer Leave to File Brief, Amici 
Curiae, Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97 (No. 78482),1979 WL 199839. 
117 Motion of the ACLU for Leave to File, and Brief Amicus Curiae, Daily Mail Publ 'g Co., 443 
U.S. 97 (No. 78482), 1979 WL 213634. 
lIS Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. at 98. 
119 Jd 
120 Briefof American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n,supra note 116, 1979 WL \99845, at "10. 
121 Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. at lOH)2 (citations omitted). 
122 Id at 103. 
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sufferance of government to supply it with information,,123 --Chief Justice 
Burger said those cases "suggested" the general rule: "if a newspaper 
lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance 
then state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the 
information, absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.,,124 
Articulation of a rule seemed to put an end to this kind of litigation, as 
Justice White had once predicted,125 but ten years later, another similar case 
again reached the Court. In Florida Star v. B.J.F., a novice reporter picked 
up a police report that identified sexual assault victim B.J.F. by her full 
name from the Jacksonville police press room. 126 The unedited report had 
been left there inadvertently.127 When the paper ran a brief item using her 
full name, contrary to its own editorial policy and a Florida statute, BJ.F. 
sued on a theory of negligence per se. 128 The trial judge agreed that the 
newspaper's violation of the statute gave rise to a negligence per se claim, 
and a jury awarded BJ.F. $75,000 in compensatory and $25,000 in punitive 
damages. 129 That was affirmed per curiam by an intermediate court; the 
Florida Supreme Court declined to review. 130 The newspaper petitioned 
successfully for certiorari. l3l 
Perhaps the change in court personnel over the decade-Justices 
Burger, Stewart, and Powell were gone; Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and 
Kennedy had arrived-made this a much tougher decision. Or perhaps it . 
was the change in leadership from Chief Justice Burger to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. On its facts, this case did not look all that different from the 
previous cases. But Justice White, who dissented along with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, declared that the six-to-three Florida Star 
decision was the "bottom of the slippery slope" created by the previous 
decisions132-in each of which he had concurred. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall said Cox did not control the 
case because a police report is not a court document and does not carry with 
it the constitutionally significant notion of open trials. 133 Daily Mail 
provided the proper rule, Justice Marshall said, but he tweaked Chief 
123 ld at 104. 
124 ld. at 103. 
12S See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 571 (White, 1., concurring). 
126 491 U.S. 524, 527 (1989). 
121 ld at 528. 
128 ld at 528-29. 
129 ld at 529. 
130 ld 
131 ld 
132 ld at 553 (White, 1., dissenting). 
133 ld at 532. 
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Jastice Burger's formulation to add a "narrowly tailored" requirement: 
"[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has lawfully 
obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when 
narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order .... ,,134 And that 
was not the case here.135 In an opinion that reasonably tracked the substance 
ofthe press amici briefs, which were substantial, \36 Justice Marshall pointed 
out that a rape victim's privacy might be a state interest of the highest order 
under some circumstances, but not where the government itself provided 
the information, albeit inadvertently; where the statute covered only the 
mass media, and not other forms of dissemination, including neighborhood 
gossip; and where no fault was required for liability, making the publication 
of truthful information even less protected than publication of a libelous 
falsehood. 137 
B. Cohen v. Cowles Media\3S 
Dan Cohen was a Minneapolis public relations executive associated 
with the 1982 gubernatorial campaign of Independent-Republican 
Wheelock Whitney. 139 In late October 1982, just six days before the general 
election, Cohen contacted a number of journalists in the St. Paul-
Minneapolis area, offering to give them information concerning a 
Democratic-Farmer-Laborite (DFL) candidate in exchange for a promise of 
confidentiality.140 Among the journalists accepting the offer were reporters 
for the St. Paul Pioneer Press and the Minneapolis Star Tribune. 141 
Cohen provided the reporters with public court records showing that 
Marlene Johnson, the DFL candidate for Lieutenant Governor, had 
134 [d at 541. 
135 [d. 
136 Brief of Amici Curiae American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n & the N.Y. Times Co. et aI., Fla. 
Star, 491 U.S. 524 (No. 87-329), 1988 WL 1026321; Brief Amici Curiae of the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press & Associated Press et al. in Support of the Appellant, Fla. Star, 491 U.S. 524 
(No. 87-329), 1988 WL 1026323. 
137 Fla. Star, 491 U.S. at 538-41. 
138 501 U.S. 663 (1991). 
139 [d. at 665. See also Bill Salisbury, Burning the Source, WASH. JOURNALISM REv., Sept. 1991, at 
18. Much of this history and analysis is adapted from Eric B. Easton, Two Wrongs Mock a Right: 
Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta that Bar First Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1135 (1997) [hereinafter Two Wrongs]. 
140 Salisbury, supra note 139, at 19-20. According to Salisbury, the Pioneer Press reporter involved, 
Cohen refused even to describe the information until he received a promise of confidentiality.ld. at 20. 
141 [d. Associated Press reporter Gary Nelson and WCCO-TV reporter Dave Nimmer also received 
the information. Nelson's stories did not name Cohen, while Nimmer decided the story was not 
newsworthy. [d. 
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previously been arrested for unlawful assembly and petit theft.142 The 
unlawful assembly charges, which grew out of a civil rights demonstration, 
were ultimately dismissed. 143 The candidate had been convicted on the theft 
charge, which involved a minor shoplifting offense while she had been 
emotionally distraught, but the conviction was later vacated. 144 
Editors at both the Pioneer Press and the Star Tribune independently 
decided to print the story and, over their reporters' protests, to include the 
name of the source. 145 While the Pioneer Press editors buried Dan Cohen's 
name deep in the story, the Star Tribune editors featured it, apparently 
reasoning that the value of the story, if any, lay in Cohen's conduct, not 
Johnson's.146 The Star Tribune also attacked Cohen in its editorial pages, 
but neither paper reported that it had broken a promise of confidentiality 
with Cohen.147 
Cohen lost his job when the story broke/48 and later sued the 
newspapers' publishers alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and breach of 
contract. 149 Overcoming the publishers' First Amendment claims, Cohen 
won $200,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages 
at trial. 150 The Minnesota Court of Appeals struck down the punitive 
damage award after finding that Cohen had failed to establish a fraud 
claim. 151 The Minnesota Supreme Court struck down the compensatory 
damage award, holding a contract action "inappropriate" under the 
circumstances. 152 
During oral argument before the Minnesota Supreme Court, one of the 
justices had asked a question about estoppel, a cause of action in equity that 
might serve as an alternative to Cohen's contract claim in enforcing the 
reporters' promises.153 Addressing that issue in its opinion, the court found 
it necessary to "balance the constitutional rights of a free press against the 
142 Cohen, 50\ u.s. at 665. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 665-66. 
145 Id. at 666. 
146 Salisbury, supra note 139, at 2\-22. 
147 Id. 
148 Cohen said he was fired, and that position was adopted by the Supreme Court. Cohen, 50\ U.S. 
at 666. According to Salisbury, his supervisor said he resigned. Salisbury, supra note \39, at 22. 
149 Cohen, 50\ U.S. at 666. 
ISO Id. 
151 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.w.2d 248, 260 (Minn. Ct. App. \989). 
152 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d \99,203 (Minn. \990). 
153 Cohen, 50\ U.S. at 666-67. In a successful promissory estoppel action, one who makes, then 
breaks, a promise is prevented from denying the existence of contract, despite the absence of a contract 
formality. See REST A TEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
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common law interest in protecting a promise of anonymity." 154 In this case, 
the court said, enforcing the promise would violate the newspapers' First 
Amendment rightS.155 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to 
consider the First Amendment implications of this case.,,156 
Writing for a five-to-four majority,157 Justice White rejected the 
newspapers' argument that this case was controlled by the line of cases 
holding that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a 
matter of public significance then state officials may not constitutionally 
punish publication of the information, absent a need to further a state 
interest of the highest order.,,158 Instead, Justice White said, the case was 
controlled "by the equally well-established line of decisions holding that 
generally applicable laws do not offend the First Amendment simply 
because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its 
ability to gather and report the news.,,159 
Justice White proceeded to list a number of cases-starting with 
Branzburg v. HayesI6°-purporting to demonstrate that enforcement of 
general laws against the press is not subject to any stricter scrutiny than 
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations.161 
Finding Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel just such a "law of 
general applicability," Justice White had no problem applying it to the 
press. 162 He even suggested that the newspapers' breaking their promises 
might serve as a predicate for finding their conduct unlawful, thus arguably 
negating First Amendment protection for the information itself.163 
Justice White further distinguished Cohen's situation from that of a 
plaintiff seeking to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel 
claim by stating an alternative cause of action. Specifically citing Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, in which the Court denied a claim for intentional 
infliction of emotional distress without a showing of actual malice,l64 
Justice White pointed out that Cohen had not sought damages for injury to 
154 Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 205. 
155 ld. 
156 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 667. 
157 Dissenting opinions were written by Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and Souter, 
id. at 672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), and Justice Souter, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackrnun, and 
O'Connor, id. at 676 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
158 ld. at 668~9 (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979». 
159 ld. at 669. 
160 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
161 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70. 
162 ld. at 670. 
163 ld. at 671. 
164 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
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his reputation or state of mind, but rather for the loss of his job and his 
lowered earning capacity.165 
Finally, Justice White tackled the argument that allowing the 
promissory estoppel claim would inhibit the press from disclosing the 
identity of a confidential source when, as in Cohen, that information is 
newsworthy.166 If true, he said, the "chilling effect" would be "no more than 
the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of applying 
to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain 
kinds of promises to keep them.,,167 
Writing for Justices Marshall and Souter in dissent, Justice Blackmun 
argued that Hustler should have controlled the outcome in this case and that 
First Amendment protection applies to published speech regardless of the 
cause of action asserted. 168 Justice Blackmun saw no meaningful distinction 
between the kinds of damages sought by Jerry Falwell and those sought by 
Daniel Cohen.169 Justice Souter also filed a separate dissenting opinion, 
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, that rejected Justice 
White's reliance on the doctrine of "generally applicable laws," denying 
any "talismanic" quality in such laws.I7O Justice Souter would have found 
the state's interest in protecting the promise of confidentiality insufficient to 
outweigh the value of the information revealed in this case. 171 Nevertheless, 
the case was remanded to the Minnesota Supreme Court, which reversed its 
previous position and held the newspapers liable for Cohen's damages on a 
theory of promissory estoppel. 172 
In his account of this case, Cohen's lawyer, Elliot Rothenberg, called 
the decision "the worst defeat the media had ever suffered in the Supreme 
COurt.,,173 Even allowing for some self-indulgent boasting, Rothenberg was 
not far off the mark.174 How had the press blown such a big one? Clearly, 
there was no lack of legal talent applied to the case. Both newspapers 
brought in new legal teams for the Supreme Court contest-"heavy 
165 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671. 
166 /d. 
167 [d. at 671-72. 
168 [d. at 674 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). 
169 [d. at 675-76. 
170 [d at 677 (Souter, 1., dissenting). 
171 [d. at 679. 
172 Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 388 (Minn. 1992). 
173 ELLIOT C. ROTHENBERG, THE TAMING OF THE PRESS: COHEN V. COWLES MEDIA COMPANY 218 
(1999). 
174 In the interest of fulJ disclosure, Rothenberg cites my own ("[a] pro-media law professor") 
appraisal of this case as "cut[ ting] short the natural evolution of First Amendment protection for 
newsgathering and set[ting] the stage for many wrongheaded opinions coming out of the lower courts 
today." /d. at 254 (quoting Easton, Two Wrongs, supra note 139, at 1153). 
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artillery," Rothenberg called them. 175 Supreme Court specialist Stephen M. 
Shapiro became lead counsel for the Pioneer Press, and eight lawyers 
signed its brief. I76 Minneapolis lawyer John French-Harvard Law School 
and clerk for Justice Felix Frankfurter-took over the Star Tribune 
campaign, and four lawyers signed its brief.177 Rothenberg's description of 
the press amici is particularly apt: 
Shapiro's and French were not the only blue-ribbon lawyers joining the 
case on the other side. In fact, a battalion of the nation's leading lawyers 
and most prominent media organizations entered the Supreme Court 
appeal supporting the Star Tribune and Pioneer Press. Nineteen attorneys 
from leading law firms in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles filed a 
third brief opposing mine. Their amicus curiae brief represented the big 
I fA ' d' 178 eagues 0 men can me Ia .... 
Nor were the press's arguments off track. Indeed, they paralleled, if not 
influenced, the arguments of the four dissenting Justices.179 Apart from 
Rothenberg himself, there was no outstanding opposition to the press's 
position; heavy hitters like the United States and the ACLU did not have a 
dog in the hunt, and even those in or involved with the media who 
thoroughly disapproved of the newspapers' conduct stayed out of the 
Supreme Court action. 
Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify reasons why the press lost 
this case. Arguably, the case should have ended with the first state supreme 
court opinion; the state court rejected Cohen's contract claim and Cohen 
had not raised promissory estoppel. I80 The First Amendment question, 
essential to getting the case to the U.s. Supreme Court, need never have 
been reached.18I Timing, too, was a problem for the press. Justice Brennan 
retired just before the case was heard, and although his successor, Justice 
Souter, also supported the press's position, Justice Brennan's voice would 
have been a far more powerful counterweight to Justice White's hostility. 182 
175 Id at 180. 
176 Id 
177 Id 
178 Id; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. & American Newspaper 
Publishers Ass'n et al. in Support of Respondents, Cohen v. Cowles Media, SOl U.S. 663 (No. 90·634) 
(1991),1991 WL 11007832. 
179 See Brief of Amici Curiae Advance Publications, Inc. & American Newspaper Publishers Ass'n et aI. in 
Support of Respondents, supra note 178, at .3-6. 
180 ROTHENBERG, supra note 173, at 154-55. 
181 Id at 156. 
182 Id at 158. 
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But perhaps the most serious problem of all was the nature of the case itself 
and the dissention it engendered within the media establishment. 
It was, after all, in the nature of Cohen that the press was forced to 
argue that promises of confidentiality to sources were not serious enough to 
be considered contracts without weakening the central argument in 
Branzburg that such promises deserved constitutional protection.183 If not 
altogether untenable, the press's position was at best precarious. It was also 
highly contentious. Rothenberg quotes University of Minnesota journalism 
professor Ted Glasser as characterizing the trial as more "between reporters 
and editors" than between plaintiffs and defendants,184 and urging reporters 
to oppose the newspapers in any appeal. Glasser wrote: 
To claim to have a First Amendment right to renege on a reporter's 
promise not only places the press above the law but denies reporters the 
very freedom they need to operate in the day-to-day world of journalism. 
Reporters have every reason to file a friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of 
Cohen. 18S 
There was no reporters' brief at any level, and the Reporters Committee 
for Freedom of the Press was not a signatory to the press's amicus brief. 
The Washington Post also declined to join, as did a number of other media 
companies who might otherwise have been expected to participate.186 
Rothenberg'S petition for certiorari had capitalized on that dissention by 
quoting star media lawyer Floyd Abrams calling the newspapers' conduct 
in breaking their reporters' promises of confidentiality "reprehensible and 
damaging to all journalists.,,187 Shortly before the decision came down, 
Abrams again spoke out publicly in a speech and op-ed column, charging 
that: 
[The newspapers] acted in a fashion contrary to core principles of 
journalistic ethics. They also invited the lawsuit now awaiting decision by 
the Supreme Court, one that offers enemies of the press a particularly 
inviting target. What the Minnesota newspapers did was wrong; they 
should have said so. Why is any defender of the press unwilling to say as 
much?188 
183 Id at 181. 
184 Id. at 180. 
18S Id. at 134-35 (quoting Theodore L. Glasser, Reporters Seen as Winners in Cohen Verdict, MINN. 
J., Oct. 4, 1988, at I). 
186 Id at 214. 
187 Id. at 166. 
188 Id. at 214 (quoting Floyd Abrams, Battles Not Worth Fighting, WASH. POST, June 13, 1991, at 
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There is no direct evidence that the division within the press over the 
Cohen case had a significant or even marginal influence on the outcome. 
Nor was there any direct evidence that differences among media 
organizations played a significant role in the Court's rejection of 
constitutional protection for confidential sources in Branzburg v. Hayes, 
although those differences certainly weakened the campaign for federal 
shield legislation. There is no doubt, however, that the two most important 
news gathering cases ever to reach the u.s. Supreme Court did not show the 
press in the best light as a constitutional litigator. 
C. The District Court Opinion 
For the district court, the conflict between Landmark and Cohen was 
easily resolved. According to the court, Landmark only applies where "a 
state actor attempted to place a prior restraint on specified speech or where 
the intentional interception was legal but the disclosure was illegal.,,189 
Here, the court said without further explanation, "there exist no statutory 
provisions specifically designed to chill free speech.,,190 Thus finding 
Landmark inapplicable, the court went on to find Cohen controlling. "In 
reviewing both the federal and the state electronic surveillance laws, we 
conclude that both acts are matters of general applicability.,,191 
In his motion for reconsideration, Brobst argued that the court's 
reliance on Cohen was misplaced and that Landmark did not involve a prior 
restraint. ln The Virginia statute at issue in Landmark was "generally 
applicable" and did not "single out the press," yet the Supreme Court 
reversed the newspaper owner's conviction on First Amendment grounds. 193 
This case, Brobst argued, is indistinguishable. 194 Moreover, he said, by 
breaking its promise to Cohen, the press arguably obtained its information 
unlawfully; here, there was no question that the press obtained its 
information lawfully from Yocum, whatever might have happened 
earlier. 195 Perhaps recognizing that engaging in a serious analysis of the 
issue before it on a motion for summary judgment was probably a waste of 
A21). 
189 Bartnicki v. Vopper, No. 3:CV-94-1201, 1996 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 22517, at *10 (M.D. Pa. June 
14, 1996). 
190 ld. 
191 ld. at *12. 
192 Media Defendants' Brief in Support of Their Motion for Reconsideration, Bartnicki, No. 3:CV-
94-1201, at 5-{j (M.D. Pa. July 1996)(on file with author). 
193 ld. at 6. 
194 ld. 
195 Id. at 7. 
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time and effort, the district court denied Brobst's motion and kicked the can 
down the road. 196 Brobst asked Judge Kosik to certify the case up to the 
Third Circuit and he agreed. 197 
While Brobst might have taken the case to trial instead of appealing 
Judge Kosik's denial of his motion, he acknowledged that there would have 
been no point in going that route. Apart from the constitutional claim, 
Brobst said: 
[W]e didn't have much [in the way of another] defense in this case. They 
had us dead to rights on what we did. We clearly had broadcast the tape 
many times. There was no doubt about that. It was pretty hard for us to 
claim that we didn't know that it had been a surreptitiously recorded 
tape. 198 
In fact, Brobst said: 
[W]e had a settlement agreement with the other side ... that the outcome 
of the appeal would decide the outcome of the case because there was no 
sense going to trial .... If we win [on the constitutional issue], we don't 
have to pay them anything, obviously, and if they win, it was a fixed 
amount of money that we would pay them. 199 
While the agreement reserved the right of either party to petition the 
Supreme Court for review, Brobst said neither side really expected the case 
to go that far.2°O 
N. CIRCUIT COURT: APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
On appeal, the parties agreed that no factual issues barred the Third 
Circuit from resolving the legal issues/o 1 which boiled down to one: Does 
the First Amendment bar the imposition of liability for publishing truthful 
information of public significance, where both the acquisition and 
publication of that information are prohibited by statute and where the 
publisher was not involved in the unlawful acquisition?202 
196 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 113 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 u.s. 1260 (2000). 
197 Id 
198 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
199 Id 
200 /d. 
201 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 10, 1998 WL 34082380, at ·10. 
202 Id. at 2, 1998 WL 34082380, at *2. 
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As might be expected, the appellants continued to rely on the Landmark 
doctrine and related cases, asserting that the government's interest in the 
privacy of cellular telephone communications is "significantly less[]" than 
the interest at stake in Landmark.203 The appellants also cited a remarkably 
similar case in which the u.s. District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas ruled that the First Amendment protected the press from civil liability 
for reporting the contents of an illegally recorded telephone conversation of 
a school board trustee, where the tape had been recorded anonymously, 
delivered to certain school board members, and played at a public school 
board meeting. 204 
Perhaps even more interesting was the appellants' attempt to 
distinguish Cohen by reciting many of the arguments used against the 
media companies in that case: that the newspapers determined the scope of 
their own legal obligations by contract, that any restriction on publication 
was thus self-imposed, and that the newspapers may not have acted 
lawfully in acquiring the information by reneging on a promise of 
confidentiality.205 The appellants also argued that the impact of enforcing 
the disclosure provisions of the wiretapping statutes would be far greater 
than "incidental," as required to impose the Cohen doctrine?06 
The appellees framed the case as a contest between the Landmark and 
Cohen principles, although of course they asserted that Cohen applied to 
this case.207 The appellees also found a similar case in which a state trial 
court had distinguished the Landmark line on two grounds: (1) that the 
information in those cases had been properly part of the public record, 
albeit protected by statutory confidentiality; and (2) that the information in 
the case had been a private conversation, rather than governmental 
203 Jd. at 19, 1998 WL 34082380, at *19. One could argue the opposite position, of course: that the 
government's interest in protecting government speech is lower than its interest in protecting private 
speech, albeit private speech on a public matter. But see Boettger v. Loverro, 587 A.2d 712,720-21 (pa. 
1991) ("Thus the legislature intended for the public interest in a free press to supersede the interests of 
an individual whose private conversation regarding his illegal activities had been lawfully intercepted 
and lawfully obtained by a newspaper." (footnote omitted». 
204 Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 22, 1998 WL 34082380, at *22 (citing Peavy v. 
New Times, Inc., 976 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Tex. 1997». The following year, however, the Peavy decision 
would be reversed in pertinent part by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which 
applied an intermediate scrutiny test. Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158,193 (5th Cir. 1999). 
20S Amended Brief of Appellants, supra note 27, at 25, 1998 WL 34082380, at *25. 
206 Jd. at 25-26, 1998 WL 34082380, at *25-26. 
207 Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, at 11, 1998 WL 34083465, at *11. 
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records.208 That case never mentioned the Cohen doctrine at all, but the 
appellees devoted a section to amplifying the district court's assertions.209 
The appellees added some new arguments as well. First, they asserted 
that the Landmark-related holdings were very narrow and limited to their 
specific facts?1O Specifically, the appellees pointed to the famous footnote 
eight in Florida Star in which the Court declined to address the question of 
"unlawfully" acquired information,211 suggesting the appellants' reliance on 
those cases was therefore "misplaced.,,212 The appellants, of course, would 
find that footnote irrelevant, since they committed no unlawful act in 
acquiring the information. 
But even if the strict scrutiny of Landmark controlled, the appellees 
argued, the wiretapping statutes would pass muster because they were 
narrowly tailored to protect privacy rights of the highest order.213 Drawing 
on legislative history, the appellees asserted that Congress was aware of and 
increasingly concerned about the impact of modem communications 
technology on personal privacy and the law's failure to keep up with that 
technology.214 
Appellant Yocum had claimed the status of news-gatherer in his less-
than-coherent brief to the Third Circuit, citing Branzburg v. Hayes for the 
proposition that he was therefore entitled to First Amendment protection.215 
The appellees pointed out that, if anything, Branzburg stands for the 
proposition that news-gatherers enjoy very limited protection, supporting 
their argument based on the Cohen principle, and that in any case, Yocum's 
case would succeed or fail on the same grounds as the other appellants' 
case?16 
208 Id. at 11-13, 1998 WL 34083465, at *11-13 (citing Natoli v. Sullivan, 606 N.Y.S.2d 504 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1993), aff'd, 616 N.Y.S.2d 318 (N.Y. App. 1994». 
209 Id. at 17, 1998 WL 34083465, at * 17. 
210 Id. at 20, 1998 WL 34083465, at *20. 
211 Id. at 20-21, 1998 WL 34083465, at *20-21 (citing Florida Star v. RH., 491 U.S. 524, 535 n.8 
(1989) (citations omitted), which states, "The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in 
cases where information has been acquired unlawfolly by a newspaper or by a source, government may 
ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing publication as well. This issue was raised 
but not definitively resolved in New York Times Co. v. United States and reserved in Landmark 
Communications. We have no occasion to address it here."). 
212 Id. at 21, 1998 WL 34083465, at *21. 
2Il Id. at 13, 1998 WL 34083465, at * 13. 
214 Id. at 15, 1998 WL 34083465, at *15. 
215 Brief on Behalf of Appellee, Jack Yocum at 15, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 
1998) (No. 98-7156), 1998 WL 34082376, at *15 (citing 8ranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 
(1972». 
216 Brief of Appellees, supra note 39, at 28-29,1998 WL 34083465, at *28-29. 
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The only amicus brief in the Third Circuit was filed by the PSEA on 
behalf of the appellees, and that brief largely echoed the appellees' analysis. 
It raised-and criticized-another new decision based on similar facts,217 
and it added another argument analogizing the imposition of civil liability 
for violation of copyright law and for violation of the wiretap law's 
disclosure provisions.218 Two aspects of the PSEA brief, however, bear 
mention because of their emphasis in the government's brief and the Third 
Circuit opinion. Unlike either the district court opinion or the appellees' 
brief, the PSEA brief put particular emphasis on the wiretap statute's 
prohibition of "use[s)" of the intercepted materials other than disclosure to 
show its more general applicabiliryl19 and characterized the Landmark line 
as involving "heightened scrutiny" dependent upon the lawfulness of the 
information's initial acquisition.220 Both of these arguments would be 
substantially amplified in the federal government's brief and addressed, 
albeit negatively for the most part, in the Third Circuit opinion. 
There were no amicus briefs supporting Vopper's position. Brobst does 
not know why there was no support from other media organizations at this 
stage-"they certainly would have been aware of the case"-but he 
acknowledges that he did not solicit any amicus briefs from those 
organizations.221 Given the outcome in the Third Circuit, there was no 
apparent need for such support. 
Following oral argument before the Third Circuit, the United States 
filed a brief-signed by the Assistant Attorney General for the Justice 
Department's Civil Division, the U.S. Attorney for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, and two staff appellate attorneys-defending the 
constitutionality of the wiretap statute's disclosure provision against the 
appellants' as-applied challenge.222 Under federal law, the United States has 
the right to defend the constitutionality of any federal statute challenged on 
constitutional grounds.223 Although Brobst argued that his "as-applied" 
challenge did not rise to that level/24 the Third Circuit saw the case 
217 Brief of Pennsylvania State Education Ass'n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees, supra note 39, at IS n.7, 1998 WL 34083460, at ·15 n.7 (discussing Boehner v. McDennott, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11509 (D.D.C. July 27, 1998), which held that "protecting the privacy of 
electronic communications is not of sufficiently 'high[] order' to justify punishing publication of such 
communications." (citation omitted». 
218 !d. at 7-8,1998 WL 34083460, at ·7-8. 
219 !d. at 14, 18-19, 1998 WL 34083460, at ·14, ·18-19. 
220 Id. at 16, 1998 WL 34083460, at *16. 
221 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
222 Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at I, 1998 WL 34082480, at .1. 
223 28 U.S.C. § 2403(a) (2006). 
224 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
314 UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVILLE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 50:287 
otherwise and immediately after the argument duly issued a letter inviting 
the government to file a post-argument brief in the case.225 The 
government's brief points out that its filing was both "at the invitation of 
the Court" and pursuant to its motion to intervene as of right under the law 
to defend the constitutionality of the wiretap statute.226 
The United States can be something of an 800-pound gorilla when it 
litigates or intervenes in a constitutional challenge.227 In an analysis of 
twenty-four Supreme Court decisions in which the press litigated against 
the federal government, the press won only eight--or 33.3%.228 In this case, 
the United States framed the issue less in terms of competing precedents, as 
the parties had done, than in terms of levels of First Amendment scrutiny to 
be applied.229 The Third Circuit's opinion would track the government's 
approach. 
Following a focused description ofthe wiretap statute allegedly violated 
by Vopper, and a synopsis of the proceeding thus far, the government 
summarized its argument: the First Amendment does not prohibit the 
application of the wiretap statute's "use prohibitions" to the defendants in 
this case.230 As applied, those provisions are "subject only to intermediate 
scrutiny under the First Amendment, rather than strict scrutiny, and the 
statute readily satisfies the requirements of intermediate scrutiny.,.231 Thus, 
one argument among others suggested in the PSEA brief had become the 
foundation for the government's position. 
The government argued that the statute's ban on disclosure had to be 
read as part of a comprehensive ban on all uses of intercepted material; 
thus, the prohibition did not single out speech for any special burden.232 
Where that is so, where any burden on speech is merely incidental to the 
purpose of the law, First Amendment precedent dictates the application of 
intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny in determining its 
constitutionality.233 A statute satisfies intermediate scrutiny if it furthers an 
"important" or "substantial" governmental interest (in contrast to strict 
scrutiny's "compelling" interest); if that interest is unrelated to the 
225 Brief for the United States, supra note 60, at 10, 1998 WL 34082480, at *10. 
226 Id. at I, 1998 WL 34082480, at * J. 
227 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Government Gorilla: Why Does Government Come out Ahead in 
Appellate Courts?, in IN LITIGATION, DO THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD? 342 (Herbert M. 
Kritzer & Susan Silbey eds., 2003). 
228 Easton, Interest Group, supra note 7, at 257-58. 
229 Briefforthe United States, supra note 60, at 11-12, 1998 WL 34082480, at *11-12. 
230 Id at 11, 1998 WL 34082480, at *11. 
231 Id. 
232 Id 
2J3 Id at 18-19, 1998 WL 34082480, at *18-19. 
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suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on speech is 
not unnecessarily great (in contrast to strict scrutiny's "no less restrictive 
alternative available,,).234 
lntermediate scrutiny is also appropriate, the government said, where 
the prohibitions on the use of illegally intercepted communications are not 
related to the content of the cornmunications.235 Pointing out that the 
appellants would be free to broadcast the very same tape if acquired 
lawfully, the government noted that such content-neutral restrictions on 
speech also require courts to apply intermediate, rather than strict, scrutiny 
in evaluating their constitutionality.236 The restrictions at issue in the 
Landmark line of cases asserted by the appellants required strict scrutiny 
because they singled out speech for special burdens and restricted speech 
because of its content, among other reasons.237 
Having established the appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny, the 
government then proceeded to show how the wiretap statute satisfied that 
standard. The privacy interest to be protected is "manifestly substantial." 238 
Moreover, by protecting the confidentiality of communications, the 
regulations encourage, rather than suppress, free expression.239 And, finally, 
the regulations are tailored carefully enough that they would even satisfy a 
strict scrutiny standard?40 
It was a powerful argument, invoking not merely competing analogies, 
but basic principles of First Amendment analysis; indeed, the Third Circuit 
adopted just such an approach. Writing for herself and Judge Robert 
Cowan, Judge Dolores Sloviter rejected the appellants' argument that 
Landmark was controlling, noting that the question before the court had 
been expressly reserved by the Supreme Court.241 "[W]e will resolve the 
present controversy not by mechanically applying a test gleaned from Cox 
and its progeny, but by reviewing First Amendment principles in light of 
the unique facts and circumstances of this case.,,242 But Judge Sloviter also 
rejected the district court's application of Cohen. Expressing some doubt 
that the wiretap statute's disclosure provision was a law of general 
applicability, she pointed out that even if it were, Cohen did not stand for 
234 !d. at 19, 1998 WL 34082480, at ·19. 
235 Jd at21, 1998 WL 34082480, at *21. 
236 Jd at 22, 1998 WL 34082480, at *22. 
237 Jd at 27-32,1998 WL 34082480, at *27-32. 
238 Jd at 13, 1998 WL 34082480, at *13. 
239 Jd at 35, 1998 WL 34082480, at *35. 
240 !d. at 39, 1998 WL 34082480, at ·39. 
241 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109,117 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1260(2000). 
242 Jd. 
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the proposition that laws of general applicability are not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny. 243 Rather, the Supreme Court held only that 
"'enforcement of such general laws against the press is not subject to 
stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other persons 
or organizations. ",244 
As if to emphasize the importance of the United States as a party in this 
case, Judge Sloviter's analysis all but ignores the original parties and 
addresses the government's brief directly. Briefly summarizing its argument 
for intermediate scrutiny, Judge Sloviter proceeded to mock the 
government's assertion that the statute's ban on "disclosure" is merely an 
aspect of its ban on "use"-that is, conduct, rather than speech-and thus 
merited intermediate scrutiny.245 "A statute that prohibited the 'use' of 
evolution theory would surely violate the First Amendment if applied to 
prohibit the disclosure of Charles Darwin's writings .... ,,246 
On the other hand, the court found the content-neutrality argument 
more persuasive, based on the Supreme Court's definition of content-
neutral restrictions on speech as restrictions that "are justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.,,247 Had the Federal 
Wiretapping Act's only purpose been to prevent the disclosure of private 
facts, Judge Sloviter suggested, its content-neutrality might be doubted.248 
But the government did not rely on that justification; rather, she said, 
insofar as the Act's purpose was to deny the illegal interceptor a market for 
the "fruits of his labor," it was properly treated as content-neutral and 
intermediate scrutiny applied.249 
After reviewing various interpretations of the intermediate scrutiny 
standard, Judge Sloviter formulated the question before the court as 
"whether the government has shown that its proffered interest"-
eliminating the demand for intercepted communications-is sufficiently 
furthered by imposing liability on the defendants in this case to justify the 
restrictions on their First Amendment interests.25o Finding the connection 
"indirect at best," the court concluded that "it would be a long stretch 
indeed" to conclude that imposing damages here would even peripherally 
243 ld at 118. 
244 ld. (quoting Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991». 
245 ld at 121. 
246 ld. 
247 ld. at 122 (quoting Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,48 (1986». 
248 ld at 123. 
249 ld 
250 ld at 125. 
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promote the government's effort to deter interception.251 Since the Act 
already provides punishment for illegal interception, it would be more 
effective to enforce those provisions than to impose liability here?52 
Writing in dissent, District Judge Louis Pollak agreed with the 
majority's analytical approach to the case, but not with its application. 
Judge Pollak took issue with the court's assertion that the connection 
between prohibiting disclosure and preventing interception was "indirect at 
best," citing a recent decision, Boehner v. McDermott, from the u.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit to the contrary.253 In that 
case, the court opined that, "[ u ]nless disclosure is prohibited, there will be 
an incentive for illegal interceptions; and ... the damage caused ... will be 
compounded.,,254 The majority distinguished Boehner on the ground that the 
newspapers reporting the intercepted conversation were not defendants in 
that case, and that defendant McDermott, who provided the tape to the 
newspapers, knew who had intercepted the conversation and had a political 
interest in its disclosure.255 
Following the judgment, Bartnicki and Kane moved for a rehearing by 
the entire Third Circuit court. According to Brobst, the motion failed by 
only one vote, suggesting the case was much closer than the panel decision 
would indicate.256 
v. BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: THE PRESS TAKES NOTICE 
A. The Certiorari Process 
On April 19, 2000, Bartnicki and Kane filed a petition for a writ of 
certiorari, asking the u.S. Supreme Court to review the Third Circuit 
decision.257 Their original lawyer, Wilkes-Barre attorney Raymond P. 
Wendolowski, was still listed on the brief supporting their petition/58 but 
with the stakes now that much higher and the venue shifting to Washington, 
Wendolowski was no longer listed as counsel of record. That responsibility 
was assumed by Robert H. Chanin and Jeremiah A. Collins of the 
251 Id at 125-26. 
252 !d. at 126. 
253 Id at 130 (pollak, 1., dissenting). 
254 Id at 133 (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463,470 (D.c. Cir. 1999». 
25S Id at 128-29. 
256 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
257 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1687), 2000 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059. 
258 Id 
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Washington, D.C., firm of Bredhoff & Kaiser,259 a thirty-plus-lawyer firm 
that specialized in representing unions.26o Collins had been part of the team 
that wrote the Pennsylvania State Education Association's amicus brief for 
the Third Circuit.261 The Bredhoff firm was far more experienced in 
Supreme Court litigation and styles itself"the voice oflabor.,,262 
Taking a cue from the dissent below, Bartnicki argued that the Supreme 
Court should review the case because the Third Circuit decision conflicted 
with Boehner, setting up a conflict between two circuits that the Supreme 
Court ought to resolve.263 That kind of argument is considered one of the 
most effective at this stage of the process; if four Justices agree that a 
conflict exists, the Court will invariably take the case.264 Bartnicki also 
argued that the decision below not only struck down an important provision 
of a federal statute, but also called into question similar statutes enacted by 
a majority of the states?65 The Third Circuit majority had disparaged that 
argument as hyperbole when raised by the dissent, pointing out that its "as 
applied" decision was expressly limited to the facts of this case.266 
Finally, Bartnicki asserted that the Third Circuit opinion was just wrong 
as to an important question of constitutional law that had been reserved by 
the Supreme Court in prior decisions.267 The petition asserted that the case 
provided "an ideal vehicle" for determining whether "a statute that protects 
privacy interests by making it unlawful for a person to disclose information 
unlawfully obtained by another violates the First Amendment .... ,,268 The 
following week, the United States weighed in, seeking certiorari on its own 
behalf as an intervenor in the case, with Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman 
listed as counsel ofrecord.269 The government's argument closely paralleled 
Bartnicki's. 
259 Id 
260 See Welcome to Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.c., BREDHOFF & KAISER P.L.L.C., 
http://www.bredhoff.com (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
261 See supra notes 217-20 and accompanying text. 
262 See Welcome to Bredhoff & Kaiser, P.L.L.C., supra note 260. 
263 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 12, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059, at 
·20-21. 
264 H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 127-28 (1991). 
265 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 14-15,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS \059, at 
·24-25. 
266 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d \09, 128 (3d Cir. 1999). 
267 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 257, at 15-16,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1059, at 
·25-26. 
268 Id 
269 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (No. 99-1728), 2000 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS \063. 
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When Vopper' s brief in opposition to certiorari was filed on May 30, 
the radio host was also represented by new counsel. According to Donald 
Brobst, Vopper's employer-Keymarket of NEPA, the owner of radio 
stationWILK-had been acquired by Sinclair Broadcast Group sometime 
during the pendency of the case.270 While Sinclair initially kept Brobst on as 
outside counsel, he had what he describes as a "falling out with in-house 
counsel for Sinclair that had nothing to do with this case,,,271 although part 
of the problem involved Fred Vopper. 
In one case, Brobst said, Sinclair wanted him to defend Vopper in a 
case brought by a district attorney who also happened to be running for 
judicial office.272 One of the Rosenn, Jenkins & Greenwald (RJG) partners 
was campaign treasurer, raising a potential conflict of interest for any 
lawyer in the firm. 273 Another case involved Vopper challenging the 
integrity of two judges before whom RJG had other cases pending. 274 
Sinclair's in-house counsel was "not happy about that," Brobst said, and the 
relationship started to go downhill.275 After another, unrelated dispute arose, 
they "decided to have a parting of the ways on all cases,,,276 and Brobst lost 
the chance to take Bartnicki v. Vopper to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Instead, that honor went to Lee Levine, even then a major star in the 
media law firmament, having founded his own Washington law firm-
Levine, Sullivan & Koch, L.L.P.---only three years earlier.277 This would be 
Levine's second argument before the Supreme Court; he had previously 
represented the newspaper defendant in Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. 
270 Intetview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
271 ld. 
272 ld 
273 ld 
274 ld 
275 ld 
276 ld. 
277 Levine's biography shows just how plugged·in to the media defense bar he is: 
Mr. Levine has served as Chair of the American Bar Association's Forum on 
Communications Law, as President of the Defense Counsel Section of the Media Law 
Resource Center, as Chair of both the Media Law Committee and the Publications 
Committee of the District of Columbia Bar, ... and as an ABA Advisor to the Uniform 
Defamation Act Drafting Committee of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws. He currently serves as co-chair of the Practicing Law Institute's annual 
Communications Law conference, as a member of the Board of Directors of Fred Friendly 
Seminars, Inc.[,] . . . and as a member of the Advisory Board of the Bureau of National 
Affairs' Media Law Reporter. 
Lee Levine: Biography, LEVINE, SULLIVAN, KOCH & SCHULTZ, L.L.P., http://www.pli.edulContent. 
aspx?dsNav=Rpp: I,N:4294934230-16S&ID=PE327995 (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
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v. Connaughton.278 Levine also taught media law at Georgetown University 
Law Center and co-authored a major treatise on newsgathering.279 Brobst 
recalls that he had some initial contact with the new litigation team-"I sent 
them everything they wanted,,280 -then bowed out of the case. 
Levine's brief in opposition to certiorari rejected all of the reasons for 
judicial review raised in the Bartnicki and United States petitions. The 
Third Circuit decision "constitutes an unremarkable assessment of whether 
the imposition of civil liability" on the media defendants under the Wiretap 
Act "survives intermediate scrutiny .... ,,281 "In making this fact-bound 
assessment," the brief asserted, "the Third Circuit expressly declined to 
address the 'important question of constitutional law' referenced by 
Petitioners, 'struck down' no provision of either statute, and applied the 
same standard of First Amendment scrutiny embraced by the majority of 
the District of Columbia Circuit in Boehner.,,282 
Those arguments were echoed in respondent Yocum's brief in 
opposition/83 but successfully rebutted in reply briefs from Bartnicki284 and 
the United States.285 On June 26, 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court granted the 
petition for certiorari?86 
In contrast to the Third Circuit proceeding, amicus briefs began flowing 
into the Court in September; three of them were filed by litigants in cases 
representing nearly identical issues. Representative John Boehner (R-Ohio), 
whose victory in the D.C. Circuit had prompted Bartnicki's "split in the 
circuits" argument, argued for petitioners that "there is no First Amendment 
right to distribute someone else's pilfered speech.,,287 Boehner's opponent, 
Representative James McDermott (D-Washington), whose petition for 
certiorari was still pending at the time, argued that disclosure provisions of 
the wiretap statute should be subject to strict scrutiny.288 WFAA-TV of 
m 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989). 
279 C. THOMAS DIENES, LEE LEVINE & ROBERT C. LIND, NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW (3d ed. 
2005). 
280 Interview with Donald H. Brobst, supra note 43. 
281 Briefin Opposition at 4, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. 
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060 at *7. 
282 [d. at 4, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060, at *7-8. 
283 [d. at 5-6, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1060, at *9-10. 
284 Reply Brief for Petitioners, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99-1687), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1062. 
28S Reply Brieffor the United States, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (No. 99-1687), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs 
LEXIS 1064. 
286 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). 
287 Brief of Amicus Curiae Representative John A. Boehner in Support of Petitioners at 3, Bartnicki, 
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 492, at *4. 
288 Brief Amicus Curiae of Representative James A. McDermott in Support of Respondents at 2-4, 
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Dallas, Texas, which was poised to file its own petition seeking review of 
an adverse Fifth Circuit decision,z89 sought to push the Court to the ultimate 
rule-further than any other participant: 
This case should be decided according to a simple, bright line rule: if a 
journalist breaks the law to obtain information, she is subject to whatever 
generally applicable legal penalties may be triggered by the act of 
misappropriation. However the journalist has obtained information, she 
may be punished only for any impropriety in obtaining it, and not for 
publishing it, absent a countervailing governmental interest of the highest 
order.29o 
Only one other amicus brief was filed on behalf of Bartnicki and Kane; 
the cellular telephone industry argued that ensuring the privacy of wireless 
communications would further federal policies favoring the free speech of 
cell phone subscribers and encouraging the industry's growth.29I In addition 
to McDermott's and WFAA-TV's briefs, four briefs were filed on behalf of 
the media defendants. Both the American Civil Liberties Union and The 
Liberty Project argued that strict scrutiny, rather than intermediate scrutiny, 
was the appropriate standard to apply.292 And Wall Street Journal owner 
Dow Jones & Co., with a brief signed by Supreme Court veteran Theodore 
Olson, called for "straightforward application of the Daily Mail test,,293_ 
essentially Brobst's argument in the district and circuit COurtS?94 
But the media's principal amicus brief, with Floyd Abrams as counsel 
of record, was filed on behalf of more than twenty media entities and 
organizations, including newspaper and magazine publishers, television and 
cable networks, and journalism trade and professional associations?95 The 
list of attorneys representing the amici reads like a "Who's Who" of media 
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99·1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 548, at *6-9. 
289 Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000). 
290 Brief of Amici Curiae WF AA-TV and Robert Riggs in Support of Respondents at 4, Bartnicki, 
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 578, at *6. 
291 Brief Amicus Curiae of the Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association in Support of 
Petitioners at 4-9, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 
493, at *8-16. 
292 Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU and the ACLU of Pennsylvania in Support of Respondents at 
5, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 577, at ·10; Brief 
of Amicus Curiae of The Liberty Project in Support of Respondents at 5, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 
99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 547, at ·8-9. 
293 Brief Amicus Curiae of Dow Jones & Co., Inc. in Support of Respondents at 5, Bartnicki, 532 
U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 546, at *11. 
294 Id. 
295 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, Bartnicki, 
532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579. 
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law. It is impossible to say with any certainty how much influence any brief 
may have had on the Court, but the similarity between the media. entities' 
brief and the Court's majority opinion is striking. 
B. The Amicus Brief Process 
Before discussing the content of the various briefs filed with the Court, 
a brief digression is warranted to explore the process through which the 
media bar participates as amici curiae in Supreme Court litigation today. 
According to Lucy Dalglish, the Executive Director of the Reporters 
Committee on Freedom of the Press (RCFP), the process is an informal 
one?96 For example, the RCFP first got involved in the Bartnicki case in 
June 2000.297 Legal defense director, Gregg Leslie, had put out an email 
message to a number of prominent media lawyers, among them Laura 
Handman of Davis Wright Tremaine, Bruce Sanford of Baker Hostetler, 
and Lee Levine, asking: 
Does anyone know of an amicus effort underway in Bartnicki? We've 
always been available to write one, or at least coordinate efforts, but I 
assume there will be big companies willing to pay a firm for a brief now 
that it's before the high court. If you have any information that you're 
available to share, I'd be happy to hear it.298 
Soon after, Adam Liptak, then in-house counsel for the New York 
Times, now its Supreme Court reporter, replied, "Gregg, yes, there is an 
amicus effort. The Times and others have asked Floyd Abrams to prepare a 
brief and I'm sure the Reporters Committee will be welcome [to join the 
brief] on the usual terms.,,299 By "usual terms," Liptak was referring to the 
informal arrangement through which signatories to the brief help the lead 
organization (here, the Times) pay for it. The RCFP and other nonprofits 
usually ride along for free, and when the RCFP lawyers write the brief, all 
others in the media world are invited to join at no charge.30o Typically, 
however, the private entities pay for the privilege.3ot According to Dalglish, 
the cost can vary. 302 
2% Interview with Lucy Dalglish, Exec. Dir. of Reporters Comm., Freedom of the Press (June IS, 
2010) (recording on file with author). 
297 !d. 
298 [d. 
299 [d. 
300 !d. 
301 [d. 
302 [d. 
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"It depends on how much time it's going to take, how many people [the 
lawyers] think need to do it. They've been cutting their rates a little bit 
lately. In the summertime, they want to do it more because they can use 
their summer associates if they have them. I'd say anywhere from $10,000 
to $30,000 these days is what it would COSt.,,303 Once the cost is established, 
the lead organization would begin "trolling" for signers.304 If, for example, 
the sign-on price is $1,500, Dalglish said, "[I]fyou get a whole pile of folks 
signing on, you're doing OK, but if you only get five, you've rolled the dice 
and you've lost.,,305 
As to the content of the briefs, Dalglish said amici first figure out what 
the party they are supporting has already argued, then identify other issues 
that the party did not have room for.306 "Usually, what we try to do is 
present a national perspective, do some public policy stuff, or brief an issue 
that the parties would have loved to have briefed if they had time or space. 
Sometimes they will ask you specifically, could you do this issue.,,307 Other 
times, amici will suggest the focus of the brief. In either event, amici will 
try to avoid simply repeating the party's arguments. "No court wants to put 
up with that," Dalglish said.3og "I just have no interest in parroting back the 
party's brief.,,309 
The relationship between amici and the parties varies somewhat 
depending upon the court hearing the case. Under Supreme Court ruies/ IO 
and throughout the federal system,3l1 all parties must consent to the filing of 
an amicus brief; where consent is withheld, amici may petition the court to 
receive the brief anyway. Thus, there is always some communication 
between the amici and the party they are supporting. Dalglish described the 
typical process: "You let them know you're going to do it, and they'll say 
'Hey! Yeah, that would be great-wonderful. We'll sign the letter and give 
it to you. ",312 On the other hand, the Supreme Court rules require amici to 
disclose whether counsel for a party had a hand in writing the brief or 
paying for it.313 
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Id-
308 Id. 
309 Id. 
310 SUP. CT. R. 37.2. 
311 FED. R. APP. P. 29. 
312 Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296. 
313 SUP. CT. R. 37.6. 
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Still, the parties often ignite the amicus process. If the case gets to the 
Supreme Court, it has already been percolating through the media defense 
bar. By the time they have won or lost in the appellate courts, the parties 
will have talked about it in one of several forums where members of the 
media defense bar get together. Among these are the Practising Law 
Institute's annual Communications Law Conference, founded and managed 
for some thirty-five years by James Goodale, now conducted by Lee Levine 
as Communications Law in the Digital Age;314 the biennial conference and 
other meetings of the Media Law Resource Center, formerly the Libel 
Defense Resource Center, also based in New York;315 the annual conference 
and various workshops of the American Bar Association's Forum on 
Communications Law;316 and the annual Media and the Law Seminar at the 
University of Kansas. 317 
One of the most important of these forums is the District of Columbia 
Bar Association's Media Law Committee, which meets informally once a 
month for lunch at the offices of one of the participating law firms.3\8 The 
meetings were started by Davis Wright's Laura Handman, who chaired 
them for two years.3\9 Lee Levine has also chaired the meetings, as have the 
RCFP's Gregg Leslie, Covington & Burling's Kurt Wimmer, and Holland 
& Knight's Chuck Tobin.320 Lawyers from Washington, D.C., and often 
New York, come to talk about their strategy in cases that have been argued 
or to preview upcoming cases. 321 They are not, Dalglish said, strategy 
sessions to plan how the bar might get involved.322 
That happens more informally, Dalglish said.323 Frequently, the New 
York Times takes the lead, or the Washington Post, or the Associated Press. 
"They tend to sort of rotate .... Sometimes it's the individual lawyer [who 
314 Floyd Abrams, James Goodale Passes the Torch at PLJ Communications Law Conference, 
MLRC MEDIA L. LEITER (Media Law Res. Ctr., New York, N.Y.), Nov. 2007, at 6, available at 
http://www.jamesgoodale.netlimagesIMLRC_PLI_Letter.pdf; see also Seminar, Communications Law 
in the Digital Age 2010, PRAcrtSING L.INST. (Nov. 26,2010), http://www.pli.eduiContent.aspx?dsNav= 
Rpp:I ,N:4294963947-167&ID=60604. 
315 See About MLRC, MEDIA L. REs. CTR., http://www.medialaw.orgITemplate.cfin?Section= 
About_MLRC&Template=/ContentManagementIHTMLDisplay.cfin&ContentID=8828 (last visited 
Nov. 23,2011). 
316 See About Us, AM. BAR ASS'N, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/communications_law/ 
about_us.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2011). 
1I7 See KU CONTINUING Eouc., http://www.continuinged.ku.eduiprograms/media_law/ (last 
modified Nov. 4,2011). 
31S Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296. 
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is interested in a particular case]. ... Sometimes it's geographic. Sometimes 
they have a similar case percolating and they want to jump on it. . . . 
Sometimes it's driven by who's interested in covering a story.,,324 Dalglish 
says the informal system works so well because the bar is so small. "It's a 
very small group of people. Very tight knit. ... So you're seeing these 
people frequently, and you're staying on top of things frequently. . . . 
Everybody knows everybody else.,,325 
As for the Reporters Committee itself, Dalglish noted that she has 
former fellows working all over the country. "I will hire a fellow [who] will 
spend a year working here. I will work [at] getting him a job at one of the 
firms .... And then some of those folks end up going in-house because they 
don't like the law firm atmosphere. Right now, I've got former fellows in-
house at the Washington Post and National Public Radio .... [In] the last 
couple of years, my folks have been snatched up by the government ... as 
FOIA [Freedom of Information Act] officers.,,326 
Dalglish said RCFP used to be a lot more involved in direct litigation, 
pointing out that "the last time we were actually actively involved as a party 
was ... when we went in with the Center for National Security Studies ... 
to get a list of the 1,500 or so foreign nationals who were snatched off the 
streets and put in detention centers" after Sept. 11, 2001.327 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia ultimately reversed an initially 
favorable decision by the district COurt.328 During the past decade or so, 
since Dalglish has been executive director, the RCFP has been doing more 
amicus briefs.329 
"We look for cases that will have the potential to have an impact on 
what journalists are able to do, either in their home state or on the federal 
level, and that can be in regards to an open meetings or open records 
violation.,,33o "It can be getting involved in a libel case, or certainly in a 
reporter's privilege case. We tend not to get involved at the trial level," 
Dalglish said, citing lack of need, cost, and the potential to irritate trial 
judges.331 "That's not to say we haven't done it, but at the trial court level 
we usually try to get involved if it is an issue that can be of great relevance 
324 [d. 
325 [d. 
326 [d. 
327 [d. 
328 Ctl. for Nat'l Sec. Studies y. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 937 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
329 Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296. 
330 [d. 
331 [d. 
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to the media, but neither of the parties is a media entity.'.J32 Expanding on 
the RFCP's role, she added, "We may look at some of the pleadings and 
decide that there may be a benefit to having a media lawyer write the brief 
and raise some issues that perhaps [another lawyer would see 
differently]. ,,333 
Dalglish said she also tries "not to get involved at the cert. petition 
stage at the U.S. Supreme Court, unless there's a compelling reason to," 
like if it's "a case we really, really want them to take, or a case that we 
know they're going to take and we want to get the issue teed up right away. 
And, quite honestly, there's one other very important factor, and that has to 
do withjoumalism politics. We want to stake our territory. We want to do a 
brief and show that the Reporters Committee is on top of it.,,334 
"If [the case is] at an intermediate court level at the federal level, we're 
almost certainly going to get involved if it involves anything having to do 
with the media. Sometimes, they slip by US.,,335 In Bartnicki, where no 
media amicus briefs were filed in the Third Circuit proceeding, Dalglish 
recalls that other, similar cases were being "teed up" at about the same 
time.336 "Hopefully, we've gotten a little bit better at spotting them on the 
circuit level, but that doesn't mean we always catch them .... Certainly, 
when the Supreme Court took [Bartnicki], we got involved in force.,,337 
C The Briefs 
Most of the arguments in the parties' briefs had been auditioned below. 
Bartnicki and Kane began their argument for reversing the Third Circuit 
opinion by urging the Court to adopt an intermediate scrutiny standard-a 
point on which the Third Circuit agreed.338 It next walked the Court through 
an unremarkable analysis to show that the statutes, as applied, satisfy that 
standard.339 The federal government's brief made essentially the same 
332 Id. 
333 Id. 
334 Id. 
335 Id. 
336 Specifically, Dalglish was referring to Boehner v. McDermott, 191 F.3d 463 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(upholding the disclosure provisions of the wiretap act where the defendant congressman allegedly knew 
the interceptors and promised them immunity for their illegal conduct) and Peavy v. WFAA-TV. Inc., 
221 F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (upholding the disclosure provisions where the defendant television station 
not only knew the interceptions were illegal, but participated in their acquisition). 
337 Interview with Lucy Dalglish, supra note 296. 
338 Brieffor Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr. at 13, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 
(2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briefs LEXIS 494, at *26. 
339 See id. at 12-16,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 494, at *25-32. 
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case.340 For Vopper and the other media defendants, Levine argued that the 
case required application of the Daily Mail principle, another way of 
arguing for strict scrutiny, but he added that the statutes in question would 
not even satisfy intermediate scrutiny.341 Yocum, who had by now retained 
his own Supreme Court specialist, Thomas C. Goldstein, made the same 
arguments in reverse order.342 The petitioners' reply briefs broke little new 
ground. 343 
Floyd Abrams's amicus brief for the "media entities" also argued that 
the Third Circuit opinion should be affirmed on a Florida Star (i.e., 
Landmark or Daily Mail) analysis,344 noting only in a footnote that the 
statute would fail intermediate scrutiny as well.345 But Abrams prefaced his 
legal argument with a much broader policy appeal: 
From the time individuals first consider becoming journalists, two 
principles are drilled into them .... 
The first is that telling the truth about matters of public interest is what 
joumalism, at its best, is all about. ... [J]ournalists who read opinions of 
this Court find unsurprising this Court's repeated references to "the 
overarching public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the 
dissemination of truth." That public interest is directly imperiled in this 
case. 
So is the journalistic norm that in the course of gathering news, journalists 
should affirmatively seek the truth from those who have it .... 
For journalists, then, the notion that liability may be imposed upon them 
for doing nothing more or less than reporting truthfully about newsworthy 
340 Brieffor the United States at 10-15, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 491, at *22-31. 
341 Brieffor Respondents Frederick W. Vopper, Keymarket ofNEPA, Inc. and Lackazerne, Inc. at 
13-17, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 581, at *29-
39. 
342 Brief for Respondent Jack Yocum at 6-10, Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 
2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 580, at *15-23. 
343 See Reply Brief for Petitioners Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony F. Kane, Jr., Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 
514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 659; Reply Brief for the United States, 
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514 (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 658. 
344 Brief Amici Curiae of Media Entities and Organizations in Support of Respondents, supra note 
295, at 6-9,2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *15-19. 
345 ld. at 27 n.34, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *48 n.34. 
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Although the Third Circuit had viewed the government's interest in 
deterring unlawful interceptions as the most, albeit insufficiently, 
compelling justification for the statute's non-disclosure provisions, Abrams 
focused on the privacy interest.347 The privacy interests held insufficient in 
the Florida Star line of cases, he said, were no less powerful than the 
privacy interests in this case.348 Abrams asked, "[W]hy, after all, is the right 
of a rape victim not to have her name disclosed less significant than that of 
a union official not to have a telephone call disclosed in which he 
threatened to engage in criminal conduct?,,349 
Abrams moved on to reject the notion, advanced by Bartnicki, that the 
Florida Star line of cases was limited to content-based restrictions on 
speech and, thus, not appiicable to the content-neutral disclosure restrictions 
of the wiretap laws.35o Rather, he said, that line of authority is firmly 
grounded in the public interest in truth-telling.35I Abrams also made the 
seemingly unnecessary argument that the media defendants acted lawfully 
in obtaining the tape,352 then returned to balance of privacy and truth-telling 
interests.353 In the very last paragraph of the argument, almost as an 
afterthought, Abrams struck the precise theme that would dominate the 
Supreme Court's opinion: 
We offer the final thought that there is, in the end, a certain lack of 
equivalence between the First Amendment interests at stake here and the 
privacy interests that underlie the wiretapping statute. Both are important 
but only one is in the written Constitution. It should not be too late to 
assert that when the First Amendment's protection of truth-telling is pitted 
against an interest that was only first identified just over a century ago, 
some deference should be given to the Framer's expressed intentions.354 
Oral arguments were held on December 5, 2000.355 Collins led off for 
petitioners Bartnicki and Kane, and his responses to the Court's questions 
346 Id. at 2-5, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *8-14 (citation omitted). 
347 Id. at ~20, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *1~37. 
348 Id at 15,2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *29. 
349 Id. 
350 Id at 20-24, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *37-42. 
351 Id 
352 See id at 24-25, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briefs LEXIS 579, at *42-43. 
353 Id at 25-30, 2000 U.S. S. Ct Briel5 LEXIS 579, at *43-52. 
354 Id at 30, 2000 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 579, at *51-52 (footnote omitted). 
355 Oral Argument, Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (Nos. 99-1687 & 99-1728), 2000 WL 
1801619. 
2011] TEN YEARS AFTER: BARTNICKI V. VOPPER 329 
emphasized the content-neutrality of the anti-disclosure statutes?56 When a 
content-neutral statutory regime that protects important governmental 
interests would be harmed by disclosure, he said, "we believe and we have 
argued that that in essence exhausts the First Amendment concerns .... ,,357 
Solicitor General Waxman, who argued next, contradicted Collins's 
"suggestion" that no heightened scrutiny is required here.358 "That's not our 
position," he said; "we submit that the appropriate level of scrutiny is 
intermediate-level scrutiny .... ,,359 
Justice Anthony Kennedy and others expressed concern that the statutes 
created a class of speech that was forever tainted and could not be repeated 
by anyone.360 Waxman countered that once the speech became publicly 
known, the statutes would no longer apply.361 Thus a newspaper was free to 
comment on the conversation once Vopper broadcast it.362 He also defended 
the argument that enforcing the anti-disclosure statutes would deter 
unlawful interceptions.363 
Levine began his oral argument by calling attention to the threat 
contained in the intercepted conversation, which led to a distracting 
colloquy with Justice John Paul Stevens and others about whether he 
wanted to win his case on that narrow ground or on principle.364 Insisting, 
as he was bound to do, that he would take the win "any way I can get it," 
Levine focused on the Daily Mail principle as the proper basis for 
decision.365 Levine denied that the statutes' content neutrality would require 
an intermediate scrutiny analysis, but asserted that the anti-disclosure 
provisions would not survive even that modest test.366 
The balance of Levine's time was taken up with an inconclusive 
discussion of the statutes' deterrence value, and that was where Yocum's 
counsel, Thomas Goldstein, began his appearance before the Court.367 
"Even if [the anti-disclosure provisions] add some deterrent, that 
prohibition is too crude a weapon, effectively a thermonuclear bomb of 
356 Id, 2000 WL 1801619,81 *9-15. 
357 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at .11. 
358 Id., 2000WL 1801619,81 *16-19. 
359 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at .16-17. 
360 Id,2000WLI801619,at*21. 
361 Id. 
362 See id., 2000 WL 1801619, at *21-23. 
363 Id.,2000WL 1801619,at.22-23. 
364 Id,2000WL 1801619,81 *25-27. 
365 !d., 2000 WL 1801619, at .27. 
366 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at *30. 
367 Id,2000WL 1801619,81 *27-38. 
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sorts to be sustained in the sensitive area of . . . free speech. ,,368 Goldstein 
endorsed the Third Circuit's intermediate scrutiny approach,369 and took 
issue with Waxman's assertion that the statutes' effectively immunized 
down-stream commentary on the intercepted conversation.370 Waxman, in a 
brief rebuttal, defended the deterrence argument and distinguished the Daily 
Mail line of cases.371 At 12:03 p.m., Chief Justice Rehnquist declared the 
case submitted.372 
VI. THE SUPREME COURT OPINION: AD Hoc BALANCING 
In his opinion for the Court, delivered May 21, 2001, Justice Stevens 
adopted the frame that Abrams had urged-a conflict between the "full and 
free dissemination of information concerning public issues" and "individual 
privacy.,,373 Justice Stevens's formulation of the issue, however, labeled 
both interests "of the highest order," and he appeared to accept the idea, 
advanced by the petitioners, that the disclosure provisions of the statute 
would "foster[] private speech.,,374 Nevertheless, Justice Stevens promptly 
declared that the disclosures made in this case were protected by the First 
Amendment. 375 
The opinion that followed was unusually disjointed, shifting from 
doctrinal analysis, to interrogation of precedents, and ultimately to ad hoc 
balancing. Justice Stevens began by accepting the petitioners' 
characterization of the disclosure provisions as a "content-neutral law of 
general applicability.,,376 Unlike the trial court, however, he did not find that 
dispositive. "On the other hand," he said, "the naked prohibition against 
disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure speech,,,377 as if 
that somehow negated or counterbalanced the general applicability doctrine 
as applied in Cohen v. Cowles Media. 378 
Seeming to reach a dead end with this doctrinal inquiry, Justice Stevens 
shifted abruptly to interrogating precedent.379 Here, too, the analysis ended 
368 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at ·39. 
369 Id. 
370 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at ·41-42. 
371 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at .52-54. 
372 Id., 2000 WL 1801619, at ·54. 
373 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518. 
374 Id. 
375 Id. 
376 !d. at 526. 
377 Id. 
378 See supra Part I1I.B. 
379 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-29. 
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without resolution, with Justice Stevens pointing out that neither the 
Pentagon Papers case,380 nor the Landmark-Daily Mail-Florida Star line of 
cases,381 resolved the question presented here.382 The only lesson Justice 
Stevens seemed to take from these precedents was the need to balance, on 
the facts of this case, the interests served by the law against its restrictions 
on speech. 
Like the Third Circuit, Justice Stevens ultimately rejected the 
government's asserted interest in deterring interception of private 
conversations as a bona fide interest of the "highest order.,,383 Unlike the 
Third Circuit, he found the privacy interest compromised here to be a "valid 
independent justification for prohibiting such disclosures . . . .,,384 
Nevertheless, those privacy interests had to "give way when balanced 
against the interest in publishing matters of public importance.,,385 Drawing 
principally on libel cases for support, Justice Stevens held that a "stranger's 
illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from 
speech about a matter of public concem.,,386 
In a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, 
Justice Stephen Breyer emphasized the narrowness of the Court's 
holding.387 Justice Breyer, well known for his ad hoc balancing approach to 
First Amendment cases,388 cautioned that this case was decided on the facts 
that the broadcasters acted lawfully in obtaining the information and the 
information involved the threat of physical harm to others.389 It did not 
signal a "significantly broader constitutional immunity for the media," he 
wamed.390 
Justice Breyer asserted that concepts like "strict scrutiny" are 
inappropriate to resolve competing interests.391 He also seemed to put far 
more value in the deterrent effect of the anti-disclosure provisions than 
either the majority or Third Circuit opinion?92 But on these facts, Justice 
380 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
381 See supra Part 1I1.A. 
382 See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529. 
383 Ed. at 531-32. 
384 Ed. at 533. 
385 Ed. at 534. 
3&6 Ed. at 535. 
387 Ed. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
388 See, e.g., James C. Goodale, Caught in Breyer's Patch, PRACTISING L. INST., Nov. 1996, at 923; 
Bruce J. Ennis, Courtside, COMM. LAW., FalI 1999, at 14, available at http://www.abanet.org/forumsi 
communicationlcomlawyer/faI199/courtside.html. 
389 Bartniclci, 532 U.S. at 535-36 (Breyer, 1., concuning). 
39() Ed. at 536. 
391 Id. 
392 See id. at 537. 
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Breyer said, the speakers had no "legitimate" interest in the privacy of a 
threat to harm others-even where the danger had passed.393 Justice Breyer 
also emphasized that Bartnicki and Kane were "limited public figures" with 
a "lesser" interest in privacy.394 
Justice Breyer concluded that the Court did "not create a 'public 
interest' exception that swallows up the statutes' privacy-protecting general 
rule.,,395 Rather, he said, these speakers' privacy expectations were 
unusually low, while the public interest in "defeating those expectations" 
was unusually high?96 And thus, he "would not extend that holding beyond 
these present circumstances.,,397 
Of course, the dissenters would not have gone even that far. Writing for 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist correctly identified the contradiction in Justice Stevens's 
acknowledgment that the anti-disclosure provisions were "content-neutral 
law[s] of general applicability" and the outcome that Justice Stevens 
ultimately reached.398 But he inexplicably mischaracterized Justice 
Stevens's analytical approach as a kind of strict scrutiny derived from "the 
Daily Mail string of newspaper cases," which he proceeded to read as 
narrowly as possible.399 As noted above, Justice Stevens paid very little 
attention to that line of cases, and barely mentioned strict scrutiny doctrine. 
Justice Breyer's characterization of a fact-bound balancing came far closer 
to the essence of the majority opinion. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist also took issue with Justice Stevens's rejection 
of the government's deterrence argument, calling "[r]eliance upon the 'dry-
up-the-market' theory . . . both logical and eminently reasonable ... .',400 
And he emphasized the First Amendment right of Bartnicki and Kane to 
keep their conversation from the public domain.40' Finally, he castigated the 
Court for relying on the Pentagon Papers case and "other inapposite cases" 
to subordinate the right to communications privacy "to the claims of those 
who wish to publish the intercepted conversations of others.',402 
393 [d. at 539. 
394 [d. 
395 [d. at 540. 
396 [d. 
397 [d. at 541. 
398 [d. at 544 (Rehnquist, 1., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
399 [d. at 545-49. 
400 [d. at 552-53. 
401 [d. at 553. 
402 [d. at 555-56. 
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VII. CONCLUSION: A MIXED BLESSING? 
In assessing the impact of Bartnicki on the future development of First 
Amendment doctrine, one may choose to adopt the expansive reading given 
the majority opinion by the dissent or the narrow reading given in the 
concurrence. Ironically, the press would surely favor the former; indeed, 
they argued all along for strict scrutiny and the invocation of the 
constitutional privacy cases. The concurring opinion is far more 
problematic: can one broadcast an intercepted conversation that does not 
threaten physical harm? Justice Stevens's opinion is so poorly crafted as to 
leave in doubt not merely the answer, but even the proper analytical 
approach.403 
To take one hypothetical "ripped from the headlines" as this Article was 
being drafted, consider the prospective case against WikiLeaks.com for 
publishing hundreds of thousands of military and diplomatic documents 
allegedly downloaded from a government database by a disaffected 
soldier.404 As of this writing, no indictment had been handed up by a grand 
jury, but assuming arguendo that no one associated with WikiLeaks 
participated in the unlawful leaking except as beneficiary, there is only one 
difference between the case against WikiLeaks and the case against Fred 
Vopper: national security versus personal privacy as the subject matter of 
the unlawfully acquired information.405 
Thus, if one reads Bartnicki as imposing strict scrutiny when reviewing 
any restriction on the dissemination of unlawfully obtained, but publicly 
important information, where the disseminator did not participate in the 
unlawful acquisition, then WikiLeaks is home free. On the other hand, if 
one reads Bartnicki as a case of ad hoc balancing, then the Court will 
ultimately have to decide whether the freedom to publish without fear of 
sanction is outweighed in this case by national security, as opposed to 
personal privacy, considerations. 
So far, the lower courts' applications of Bartnicki have not been 
particularly helpful in that regard. Several cases have distinguished 
403 See Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability for 
Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 1099, 1118 (2002) ("Astonishingly, at no point in Justice 
Stevens's opinion does the Court come right out and say what standard of review or doctrinal test it is 
applying to the laws before it."). 
404 See Charlie Savage, U.S. Weighs Prosecution of WikiLeaks Founder, but Legal Scholars Warn of 
Steep Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2010, at AI8, available at http://www.nytimes.comJ2010/12/02/ 
worldl02Iegal.html. 
405 There are no legally meaningful differences between the website and the radio station as 
platforms or between Assange and Vopper as communicators, absent Assange's complicity in the 
unlawful leaking of the information. 
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Bartnicki on the ground that the disclosures were not a matter of public 
concern.406 Others have distinguished Bartnicki on the ground that the 
disseminator participated in the illegal conduct that led to disclosure.407 Still 
others have distinguished Bartnicki where the disclosures involved trade 
secrets,408 copyrights,409 or data mining.4lo In no case reported to date has 
the holding in Bartnicki been applied to reach a similar conclusion in an 
analogous case.411 
The scholarly literature has been rather more enlightening. In his article 
Information as Contraband, published shortly after the Court issued its 
opinion in Bartnicki, and clearly inspired by that case, Rodney Smolla saw 
Bartnicki as an immediate victory for the press, but a longer term victory 
for privacy interests.412 With a majority of Justices (two concurring and 
three dissenting) accepting an effective intermediate scrutiny standard,413 
albeit with a "newsworthiness" safety-valve,414 Smolla saw the case as 
406 See. e.g., Quigley v. Rosenthal, 327 F.3d 1044 (lOth Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Bartnicki where 
intercepted conversations regarding one family's anti-Semitic remarks about another family in the 
neighborhood were not matters of public concern); Trans Union Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1140-41 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki where speech at issue-target marketing lists comprising 
names, addresses, and financial information-involved only matters of private concern); Doe v. Luster, 
No. BI84508, 2007 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6042, at *15-16 (July 25, 2007) (distinguishing Bartnicki 
where speech at issue-a videotape of woman being raped-is not a matter of public concern); M.G. v. 
Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 512 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (distinguishing Bartnicki where 
speech at issue--photo of team coached by child molester-was not a matter of public concern). 
407 See. e.g., Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 2006), affd en bane, 484 F.3d 
573 (2007) (defendant's actual knowledge of the circumstances of the illegal interception made this case 
distinguishable from Bartnicki); Bowens v. Ary, No. 282711, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2000, at *20-21 
(Sept. 24, 2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the defendant directed the recording of a private 
conversation without consent); State v. Baron, 769 N.W.2d 34, 48 (2009) (distinguishing Bartnicki 
where the defendant illegally accessed the email account of a public official to disseminate truthful 
information about him). 
408 See DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d I, IS (Cal. 2003) (Bartnicki inapplicable, by 
its own terms, where disclosure in question involved trade secrets). 
409 See Barclays Capital, Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, 700 F. Supp. 2d 310, 354 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 
2010) (distinguishing Bartnicki where the cause of action is copyright infringement and 
misappropriation of hot news). 
410 See IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 51 (1st Cir. 2008) (Bartnicki inapplicable where 
disclosure and use of personally identifiable information by a data mining company was found to be 
conduct, not speech). 
411 Indeed, in SEC v. Rajaratnam, the court quoted Bartnicki for the proposition that "'disclosure of 
the contents of a private conversation can be an even greater intrusion on privacy than the interception 
itself'" 622 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 
533 (2001». 
412 Smolla, supra note 403, at 1149-50. 
413 [d. at 1119. 
414 /d. at 1170. 
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elevating personal privacy to an interest of constitutional dimension on a 
par with freedom of speech and press.415 
Nevertheless, Smolla drew exactly the opposite conclusion with respect 
to classified information. Hypothesizing a new "Official Secrets Act" of the 
kind enacted by Congress to punish journalists for disclosing leaked 
classified information, and vetoed by President Clinton,416 Smolla drew a 
sharp distinction between the "steal" considered in Bartnicki and the "leak" 
contemplated by the new law. Quoting both Laurence Tribe417 and Potter 
Stewart,418 Smolla asserted that "[r]espect for the structural independence of 
the media contemplated by the Constitution prohibits courts from 
conscripting journalists as leak-police.',419 Thus, to Smolla, even the 
narrowest reading of Bartnicki poses no danger for a Julian Assange-
assuming his hands are otherwise clean and WikiLeaks is found to share 
that "structural independence. ,,420 
Of course, the Court has changed since Smolla wrote in 2002, and so 
has the temper of the times. It may be that the best that can be said for the 
Bartnicki decision is that, absent participation in the unlawful acquisition of 
newsworthy information, the press is as free to publish it as changing 
societal values will allow. At the very least, the "content-neutral law of 
general applicability" no longer presents the insurmountable obstacle to 
First Amendment protection that it was under Cohen v. Cowles Media.421 
The Landmark-Daily Mail-Florida Star line of cases has emerged none the 
worse for wear--Chief Justice Rehnquist's crabbed reading garners only 
three votes. And, most importantly, Fred Vopper and his media allies got 
the outcome they wanted, if not the mandate, taking the press a small step 
closer to the ultimate goal of protection for all truthful information of public 
importance. 
41S Id. at 1150. 
416 Id. at 1166--67. 
417 Id. at 1167 ('There may be some rough 'law of the jungle' notion at work here: even if no 
sweeping right to know will be recognized as a limit on government's power to try to keep matters 
bottled up, an outsider who manages to obtain otherwise confidential information cannot then be 
prevented from disseminating it-or punished for having done so." (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 965 (2d ed. 1988)}}. 
418 [d. at 1168 ("So far as the Constitution goes, the autonomous press may publish what it knows, 
and may seek to learn what it can." (quoting Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631,636 
(I 975}}}. 
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